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The New Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of the
Past as Fixtures of the Future
By Jonathan M. Landers*
Change is coming to bankruptcy-land. For a normally lack-
luster subject area, developments in these first years of the dec-
ade of the 70's have been startling. In March of 1971, the Ad-
visory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules published a draft of pro-
posed rules with a promise of additional rules for the Chapter
proceedings;' that promise has already been partially fulfilled
with publication of rules for Chapter XIII, Chapter XI, and
Chapter X cases in September 1971, October 1972, and December
1972 respectively.2 And in late 1971, the prestigious Brookings
Institution published its long awaited study (or more properly,
indictment) of the bankruptcy system. The Brookings conclu-
sion was harsh and blunt:
This assembly of administrative and fiscal error and confu-
sion has become an accepted way of professional life for the per-
sonnel of the bankruptcy courts, their supervisors, the district
court judges, and members of the bankruptcy bar. The prob-
lems are so pervasive and so interlocked that partial solutions
are not acceptable. The mess is too bad to tinker with. We
need a new bankruptcy act, a new organizational structure, a
new personnel system, a new method of financing, and new
records and procedures.3
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.A. 1962, Colgate
University; LL.B. 1965, Harvard University. The research for this ar-
ticle was supported, in part, by a grant from the General Research
Fund of the University of Kansas.
1. ADvisoRy CommnTTEE ON BAwRsurTcY RuLEs, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT or PRoPoSED BANKRUPTcY RuLEs Am OFFICIAL FORMS UNDER CHAP-
TERS I TO VII OF THE BANKRUPTCY AcT (Mar., 1971). The Draft contains
the Proposed Rules themselves, the Official Forms, and the Advisory
Committee's Note to each of the Rules. In subsequent notes, I will em-
ploy the following citation forms: (1) Rule -, (2) Official Form No. -
and (3) Advisory Committee's Note to Rule -, at -.
2. ADvIsoRY Comvarr= ON BAixnuPvcY RuLEs, PRawuNAY
DRAFT OF PROPOSED BANKRUPTcY RuLEs AND OFFIcIAL FoRMs UNDER CH-
TER X=I OF THE BAmmUPTcY ACT (Sept., 1971); ADvisoRY CommrrrE
ON BANKnUPTcY RULEs, PRELnNARY DRAFT OF PRoPosED BA NRn ,rcY
RuLEs AND OFFICIAL FoRms UNDER CHAPTn XI oF T BANimuPrcy Acr
(Oct., 1972); ADviSORY CoMMnTFn ON BANKRuPTcY RULEs, PRELnvINARY
DRAFT OF PRoPOSED BANKRuPTcY RULES AD OFacAL FoRMs UNDER
CHAPTER X or THE BAN pTcY Acr (Dec., 1972).
3. D. STANLEY, M. GrTH, et al., BANimUPTCY: PROBLEM, PRocEss,
REFOR 4 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SrAuL' & GIrm). Although
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We may soon expect the report of the blue-ribbon Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States established by
Congress in 1970 to "study, analyze, evaluate and recommend
changes to [the present Bankruptcy Act] in order for such Act
to reflect and adequately meet the demands of present technical,
financial and commercial activities. '4 Recently, the Commis-
sion's authority and appropriation were renewed for an addi-
tional year after it reported considerable progress and the likeli-
hood of an expeditious conclusion.5 Presumably, its report
will be followed by legislative proposals and the concomitant
committee hearings, reports, and congressional debates, advice
from those interested in the proposed legislation, law review ar-
ticles, and symposia designed to acquaint the bar with the fast
moving developments.
Since the bankruptcy bar has never been accused of being in
the forefront of legal reform, and since bankruptcy is an area
which many practicing lawyers eschew through fear or ignor-
ance, it may be tentatively concluded that this recent foment is
evidence of fairly widespread dissatisfaction with the existing
bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy law is governed by the Bank-
ruptcy Act as supplemented by General Orders promulgated
by the Supreme Court, local bankruptcy rules promulgated
by various district courts, and by a variety of unwritten pro-
cedures which seem to have the force of natural law. This
"bankruptcy law" has three separate dimensions: (1) substan-
tive provisions which regulate the rights and obligations of the
bankrupt, trustee in bankruptcy, and secured, priority, and un-
secured creditors; (2) "administrative" provisions for collecting
and liquidating the assets of the bankrupt, distributing the pro-
ceeds to creditors, and insuring that the bankrupt realizes the
benefits of the Act; and (3) a procedural mechanism for resolv-
ing essentially adversary proceedings between the trustee and
third parties when litigated before the referee. For convenience,
these substantive, administrative, and procedural provisions are
scattered in a hodge podge throughout the Act; the administrative
and procedural provisions are interspersed among the general
orders.
the Brookings Institution formally disclaims responsibility for the
study (id. at viii), it was conducted and carried out as a Brookings
Institution project. See id. at vii.
4. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), codified in 11 U.S.C.
at 2055 (1970) (annot. preceeding § 1).
5. See Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 1006 Before a Subcommittee of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have appeared to many
as a model of procedural efficiency. Not surprisngly, it occurred
to some that bankruptcy procedure could be streamlined and
modernized if the same type of rules drafting expertise was ap-
plied to bankruptcy procedure. It was in 1959 that the Advisory
Committee of Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference appointed
an Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules. Although the
Committee initially contented itself with revisions of the Gen-
eral Orders and Official Forms, it later turned to a comprehen-
sive code of bankruptcy procedure. Its efforts in this direction
were spurred by legislation enacted in 1964 which removed the
requirement that bankruptcy rules be consistent with the pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act, and authorized procedural rules
which would supercede inconsistent statutory provisions.6 The
Committee's report, consisting of proposed rules, official forms,
and commentary, was issued in March of 1971.
This Article will evaluate the proposed rules governing the
"administration!' of bankrupt estates. Initial consideration will
be given to the authority of the Advisory Committee to promul-
gate bankruptcy rules and the scope of that authority. Second,
an examination will be made of the rules in the light of both the
needs and problems which confronted the draftsmen and the
available scope of the rulemaking power. The goal of this
Article is not to provide a summary of the new rules or an
outline of their main features, a task already performed by
others.7 Rather, the goal is to evaluate the rules as proposed
solutions to problems encountered in administering the bank-
rupt's estate.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY RULES-AUTHORITY AND SCOPE
A. THE SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE APPROACH TO
RULEmAKiNG AuTHoRiTy
The constitutional authorization for Congress to establish a
federal court system, coupled with the necessary and proper
clause of article I, section 8 of the Constitution, has been held to
authorize Congress to prescribe rules of procedure for the fed-
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
7. See Herzog, The Impact of the Proposed Bankruptcy Rules on
the Court, 45 A_%. BANxR. L.J. 363 (1971); Kennedy, The Proposed
Bankruptcy Rules and OfficiaL Forms, 46 AiM. BANai. L.J. 53 (1972);
Treister, A Practicing Lawyer's Primer on the Proposed New Bank-
ruptcy Rules, 45 Am. BA.NKu. L.J. 343 (1971). Mr. Treister, Referee
Herzog, and Professor Kennedy are all members of the Advisory Corn-
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eral courts.8 Since Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.9 it has been clear
that Congress might delegate all its power to regulate procedure
to a court, and specifically to the Supreme Court. Whether
Congress could delegate the power to prescribe the substantive
rules for decision is academic; each of the rules authorizing stat-
utes has contained a limitation similar to that in the Rules En-
abling Act forbidding the impairment of "any substantive rights."
And so the dichotomy: Congress regulates substance; the court-
promulgated rules regulate procedure.
This facile formula floats easily off the tongue, but unfor-
tunately provides little guidance for draftsmen who are uncer-
tain whether a particular matter is substantive or procedural.
The Supreme Court has been less than helpful in articulating a
governing standard. In Sibbach, the Court made the conclusory
contribution that a rule was procedural and therefore within the
rulemaking power of the Court if it "really regulates procedure,
-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and re-
dress for disregard or infraction of them."10
Sibbach involved the familiar Rule 35 providing for physical
examinations. Interestingly, Mrs. Sibbach had not argued that
the rule was substantive in the sense that it did not regulate
procedure. Rather, she argued, and the four dissenters would
have held, that the rule was of such importance that it was be-
yond the rulemaking power of the Court. However, there seems
little doubt the dissent would have held the rule valid if it had
been enacted by Congress. The dissent therefore rejected, or
at least qualified, the basic substance-procedure dichotomy in
determining federal rulemaking power. It recognized a third
category of nominally procedural rules which are of such import-
ance as to not be within the Court's delegated rule making power.
The Court's next efforts were equally unenlightening. Both
Rule 4(f) providing for service of process in another district in
the state, and Rule 54(b) which authorized the trial judge to en-
ter judgment on one of several claims in an action (to permit an
early appeal under the finality rule) were sustained with con-
mittee which drafted the rules. Surprisingly, there appears to have
been no other commentary. For a background on the rules, see Gig-
noux, A Progress Report on the New Bankruptcy Rules, 44 RF. J. 13
(1970).
8. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43
(1825).
9. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
10. Id. at 14.
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clusory statements that they were within the rulemaking power
of the Court." Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented as to
Rule 54(b) on the ground that the rule abrogated, at least in
part, the finality requirements of section 1291 of the Judicial
Code. It is not clear whether they regarded the rule as substan-
tive, as procedural but not within the delegated rulemaking
power, or as procedural but in derogation of the requirements of
section 1291. If it is the last, then it is difficult to understand
their argument since the Rules Enabling Act specifically pro-
vides for the supercession of inconsistent statues, which would
presumably include section 1291. It is possible, however, that
the dissent regarded section 1291 as defining the "jurisdiction"
of the Court of Appeals, and therefore not subject to change by
rule.
The most recent foray into this area was Hanna v. Plumer,'2
where the Court was content to hold that Rule 4 (d), which au-
thorized service of a summons and complaint by leaving copies
at defendant's home with a responsible person, was procedural
because it regulated practice. Without a detailed analysis of the
scope of rulemaking power, Hanna made two further observa-
tions. First, a broad dictum resolved any uncertainty over the
scope of rulemaking power by suggesting that Congress had
delegated the full extent of its consitutional power to regulate
procedure to the Court. Second, the Court recognized that while
many matters could be readily classified as substantive or pro-
cedural, there was an "uncertain area" containing those which
were "rationally capable of classification as either." Matters
falling within this uncertain area were said to be subject to
regulation as "procedure.' 3 It is no wonder that the decision
has been Widely interpreted as a virtual carte blanche to the
draftsmen of procedural rules.14
11. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1945)
(Rule 4(f) ); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co.,
351 U.S. 445 (1956) (Rule 54(b) ).
12. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
13. Id. at 471-72. Several decisions prior to Hanna had recog-
nized such an "uncertain area" and had suggested either explicitly or
implicitly that this area was subject to regulation by court-made
rule. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764
(5th Cir. 1963); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.
1960); Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41, 46-48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 949 (1960); D'Onofrio Const. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904,
909-10 (1st Cir. 1948); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756-57 &
im. 4, 5, 7, 128 A.L.R. 394, 398-99 & nm. 4, 5, 7 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 650 (1940). Cf. 2 J. MooRE, FPDERnA PRACTICE 1.04[2] (2d ed.
1970).
14. See Green, Highlights of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
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While one may be critical of the federal cases as according
excessive power to rules draftsmen, at the expense of Congres-
sional control over substance, the results of state efforts to reg-
ulate the bounds of judicial rulemaking are even less auspicious.
Compounding the problem faced by the federal courts in dis-
tinguishing substance and procedure are differing state constitu-
tional and statutory provisions allocating power among govern-
mental branches, and variances as to whether, and the extent to
which, the judicial rules are subject to legislative review. The
few attempts which have been made to provide guidelines de-
fining the scope of judicial rulemaking power have been notori-
ously unsuccessful. The most common verbal formulation at-
tempts to distinguish between rules which govern the just and
efficient conduct of the lawsuit from those which regulate the
subject matter for decision. 15 Agreement on tests, however, has
not stopped bickering concerning application of the test to par-
ticular facts. Widespread disagreements over whether rulemak-
ing authority extends to rules on venue, discretionary granting
of attorney's fees, standards for directing verdicts, statutes of
limitation, personal jurisdiction, class actions, discovery, provi-
sional remedies, appeals, and injunctions in labor disputes, pro-
vide visible evidence of the failure of the bright line approach. 10
However, the draftsmen of the bankruptcy rules did have
the benefit of recent consideration of the scope of rulemaking
authority by the authors of the recently promulgated Federal
dence, 4 GA. L. REv. 1, 6, 10, 14-15 (1969); Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and
the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a
Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MIcn. L. REv. 613, 746 (1967); Weinstein, The
Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules
of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 356, 357 (1969). Curiously, how-
ever, commentators have not objected to the delegation qua delega-
tion. Rather, almost to a man, they have reflected upon possible dam-
age to the fragile federal-state relationships protected by the Erie doc-
trine and have lamented what appeared to be federal intrusion into
an area of state power. See, e.g., McCoid, Hanna v. Plumber: The Erie
Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. Ruv. 884 (1965).
15. See Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study
of Judicial Rule Making, 55 McH. L. REv. 623, 629, 635 (1957); Riedl,
To What Extent May Courts Under Rule-Making Power Prescribe
Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 601, 604 (1940).
16. The pertinent cases and differing considerations are discussed
in C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 9, at 42 & n.116 (1947) (citing early au-
thorities); Joiner & Miller, supra note 15, at 644-53; Kaplan & Green,
The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of
Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REv. 234, 253 (1951); Levin & Amster-
dam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Con-
stitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 15-17, 21-22 (1958).
[Vol. 57:827
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Rules of Evidence.' 7 While some commentators were uneasy
about rulemaking in such controversial areas of quasi-substan-
tive rules as dead man's statutes, presumptions, and evidentiary
privileges,'8 most of this uncertainty had dissipated by the time
the draftsmen got down to work in earnest, following the de-
cision in Hanna v. Plumer. The commentary on the Rules re-
veals virtual unanimity that such quasi-substantive rules were
within the scope of the evidentiary rulemaking power.10 Rather,
the disputes involved Erie-type questions of the potential intru-
sion of federal evidence rules into areas of state substantive
power: some urged a deference to state evidentiary rules not-
withstanding federal power, while others felt no pangs about
prescribing federal rules which were inconsistent with state
rules.20 Their apparent uniformity on the power question has
obvious overtones for defining the scope of bankruptcy rule-
making.
B. BANKRUPTCY RULEMA=G AND THE SUBSTANCE
-PRocEDURE DICHOTOm-Y
The failure to articulate a workable substance-procedure
delineation is particularly troublesome when attention is turned
to bankruptcy rulemaking. In addition to rules governing sub-
stance and procedure there is a third category of bankruptcy
rules which might be called administrative, viz., rules governing
17. Both the Senate and House have recently passed legislation
which would delay the effectiveness of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See text accompanying notes 153-54 infra. Justice Douglas had previ-
ously dissented from the adoption of the Rules on the ground that they
were not within the authority delegated by the Rules Enabling Act to
regulate "practice and procedure." Order Prescribing Federal Rules of
Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 184, 185 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting). See gen-
erally 2 J. MooPs, supra note 13, 1.04 [1], at 213-15 & n.13; 5 id.
43.03.
18. See Joiner & Miller, supra note 15, at 650-51; Riedl, supra
note 15, at 605.
19. See authorities cited in note 14 supra; Wright, Procedural
Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REv. 563, 571-74
(1967). See also Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76
HARv. L. REv. 275, 294-96 (1962); Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 16, at
22-24. The House of Representatives in delaying indefinitely the ef-
fectiveness of the Rules, expressed some doubt whether such eviden-
tiary rules were within the scope of the authority delegated by the En-
abling Act. 119 CONG. REc. H 1723, H 1724, H 1727, H 1729 (daily ed.
Mar. 14, .1973) (remarks of Reps. Smith, Hungate, Holtzman, Moorhead).
20. Compare Weinstein, supra note 14, at 363-73, 376, and Wright,
supra note 19, at 571-74, with Green, supra note 14, at 10-17. See also
119 CONG. REc. H 1727-28 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973) (remarks of Rep.
Holtzman).
1973]
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the collection of the bankrupt's assets, the administration of his
estate, and the distribution of the bankrupt estate among ad-
ministration expenses, priority creditors, secured creditors, and
general creditors. In some cases an administrative matter may
evolve into a contested proceeding, as when a creditor objects to
the bankrupt's discharge, or refuses to turn over the bankrupt's
property to the trustee, or where there is a question regarding
the proper amount of a creditor's claim. Regardless of any par-
ticipation by a party in interest, there are a great many matters
of an administrative nature which must be prescribed in ad-
ministering the estate.
Apparently the Congress was oblivious to any deviation
from prior delegations of rulemaking authority when it granted
the Court rulemaking power in bankruptcy. Section 2075 of the
Judicial Code, which sanctions the promulgation of the bank-
ruptcy rules, tracks the language of the Rules Enabling Act 2 '
which authorized the civil rules by permitting the Court to pro-
mulgate "the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and
the practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act." The lan-
guage itself-"writs, pleadings, and motions"-bespeaks of rules
for litigation and not administration. Thus, even assuming a
workable substance-procedure distinction for litigation-related
matters, it remains unclear whether (1) Congress has the power
to delegate all administrative rulemaking as being within the
"procedural" category, and (2) if not, which standard separates
those administrative areas which cannot be the subject of rule-
making from those which are. For example, could the Rules
specify the circumstances under which the bankrupt may be dis-
charged? Or, could they provide that the trustee would be ap-
pointed by the court in all cases? This problem is compounded
because the Rules will supercede inconsistent statutes. Although
other grants of rulemaking authority have had similar superces-
sion provisions,22 the bankruptcy rules represent the first in-
stance of pervasive supercession of governing provisions of the
Act. The four Sibbach dissenters might be more than a little
uneasy about this feature.
When the bankruptcy draftsmen undertook to define the
scope of their rulemaking authority, the Advisory Committee
faced uncertainty over the substance-procedure dichotomy, a
lack of clarification in enabling legislation, and the need to draft
rules for the first time in this new "administrative area." As a
21. 38 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
22. See id.
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result, the Committee adopted an attitudinal test which nar-
rowly construed the scope of the Committee's authority in recog-
nition of their status as nonelected draftsmen appointed by
judges who similarly do not stand for election to public office.
For example, Professor Kennedy, Reporter for the Advisory
Committee, has noted that the substance-procedure question
came up frequently and that the "general disposition of the
Committee was not to press to the outermost reaches of the au-
thority granted but rather to defer to congressional judgment
and power in cases of doubt. '23 To be sure, such an approach is
not without precedent. Professor Wright has stated that one
reason for the widespread acceptance of judicially formulated
rules has been the essential conservatism of the draftsmen and
the limited change which has in fact been proposed. Indeed, he
has noted that the much heralded Federal Rules were not really
an innovative code, but simply a compilation in one document
of the best features of prior federal and state procedural codes.24
This "arguably substantive therefore for Congress" approach
(to paraphrase Mr. Justice Harlan) was an improper standard for
the draftsmen to adopt. First, it ignores both the teaching of
Hanna and the approach of the draftsmen of the evidence rules
which called for a broad construction of the enabling authority
to embrace matters in the "uncertain area" between substance
and procedure as well as matters clearly procedural Second,
much of the authoritative discussion concerning rulemaking
powers of courts is in the context of areas of exclusive judicial
rulemaking authority not subject to legislative correction. When
such is the case, there is good reason to narrowly circumscribe
the area not subject to control by the elected representatives of
the people.25  In the case of the bankruptcy rules, however,
23. ADVIsoRY Coi iTEE oN BANKu1PTcY RumsS, supra note 1, at
xxxv-xxxvi; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 57; Seligson, The New Bank-
ruptcy Rules, 76 CoM. L.J. 383, 384 (1971). Mr. Treister, another mem-
ber of the Committee, saw the matter somewhat differently; he termed
the Committee's approach with the indicated scope of its authority as
"rather bold." Treister, supra note 7, at 343.
24. Wright, supra note 19, at 574-77, 578-79; cf. Weinstein, supra
note 14, at 373 (should avoid rulemaking on issue of privilege since
opposition to provisions proposed may cause downfall of entire set of
proposed rules). See also Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (rule preventing settlements of deriva-
tive suits without court approval does not apply to settlement by cor-
poration; contrary result might raise questions of an improper in-
trusion into the area of substantive rights), criticized at Comment, 70
HAnv. L. Rsv. 1526, 1530-31 (1966).
25. See Kaplan & Green, supra note 16, at 253 & n.80.
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Congress has authorized the rules and the supercession of incon-
sistent statutes, and can presumably veto any or all of the pro-
posed rules.26 Third, many cases supporting a hesitant approach
involved additional considerations of federalism and a deference
to state power under the Erie doctrine, thus causing the courts
to interpret the permissible area of federal regulation more nar-
rowly. 27 No consideration of federalism is involved in bank-
ruptcy rulemaking. Fourth, unlike civil practice generally, or
rules of evidence, bankruptcy is an acutely specialized area be-
yond the ken of many lawyers, let alone the average legislator.
Consequently, there is more basis for rulemaking by experts in
bankruptcy than in the areas of procedure or evidence. In this
sense, an analogy to the delegation of rulemaking authority to
expert administrative agencies may be pertinent. The analogy
is particularly apt in light of the Brookings' proposal which
would place bankruptcy adjudication in the hands of an admin-
istrative agency. And with two exceptions, widely regarded as
aberrations,28 there have been no federal cases which have in-
validated a delegation of broad power to an administrative
agency.
Moreover, such a hesitant approach is somewhat out of place
in the decade of the seventies. Whether or not it was justified in
an era characterized by suspicion of the judiciary and exultation
of the legislative branch of government is academic. "Lawmak-
ing" by nonlegislative bodies-whether judicial or administrative
-is infinitely more acceptable today than it was more than a
quarter century earlier when the procedural reform movement
was in its infancy. Further, the specialized nature of bankruptcy
practice, the widespread cries for reform, and the publicized de-
ficiencies call for broad-based procedural innovation.
This may in fact be a situation when half a loaf is worse
than none. As already noted, in 1970 Congress created a com-
mission to study the Bankruptcy Act. The relationship between
the area of study of the Bankruptcy Commission and the bank-
ruptcy rules, then presumably nearing completion, was left in
the dark. Several supporters of the legislation authorizing the
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
27. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ra-
gan v. Merchants Transfer & Whse. Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
28. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). These opin-
ions "do not embody the effective law." 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINmTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 2.06, at 101 (1958). For a recent decision upholding a broad
delegation, see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
[Vol. 57:827
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commission noted the existence of the Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules and its activities but gave no indication of
what the relationship between the two groups would be.2 For
example, would the bankruptcy study commission exclude study
of procedural reform and accept the work of the Rules Commit-
tee, or would the two overlap? Presumably, the rules would be
superfluous if some possible alternatives to the present bank-
ruptcy administration were adopted. For example, the Brook-
ings' proposal for an administrative agency, and other proposals
for a corps of professional bankruptcy officers, would make
many of the rules dealing with administrative matters obsolete.
However, the main danger is not that the work of the Ad-
visory Committee will be rendered useless. It is instead that
the Bankruptcy Commission may defer to the recommendations
of the Rules Committee in toto even though the Rules Commit-
tee has admittedly failed to fully occupy the procedural field. A
situation could develop where the Rules Committee had not pro-
posed certain reforms or changes because it felt that it lacked
the requisite authority and the Bankruptcy Commission subse-
quently refused to consider changes because of a deference to
the Rules Committee in the area of procedural rulemaking.
Moreover, even if the Bankruptcy Commission were disposed to
consider procedural reforms which the Advisory Committee felt
it could not propose, it would have no means of identifying the
"open"' areas since the Advisory Committee has not distin-
guished reforms which were rejected "on the merits" from those
which were rejected because they were more properly the sub-
ject of legislation. If the Rules Committee in fact left a sub-
29. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11, 24 (1969)
(statements of Hon. Ernest C. Friesen, Jr., Director of the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts and Hon. Edward Weinfeld,
United States District Judge). There is some suggestion in both state-
ments that the bankruptcy rules were to fully occupy the procedural
field. For example, Mr. Friesen stated that the rules would "supplant
every procedural section of the Act," and Judge Weinfeld suggested
that the Bankruptcy Commission would have the procedural rules and
could "concentrate on the substantive provisions" of the Act However,
the statements are too cryptic to draw any meaningful conclusions.
In the hearings on the renewal of the Bankruptcy Commission's ap-
propriation, Professor Kennedy replied to a question about the rela-
tionship of the rules to the work of the Commission by stating that the
rules covered "procedural provisions," and that there would be "Close
articulation" between the rules effort and the work of the Commis-
sion. 'Hearings, supra note 5, at 25. See also Jackson, Bankruptcy
Administration-Bringing it Into the Twentieth Century, 75 CoM. .J.
159, 166 (1970).
1973]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
stantial area of procedural rulemaking alone because of ques-
tions about the scope of its authority, then perhaps it would have
been preferable to defer the entire matter of procedural change
to the Commission, with its results to be presumably incorpo-
rated into legislation, thereby avoiding any possible objections
to court-made rules. Unfortunately, partial reform is often suf-
ficient to take the edge off demands for reform, merely changing
appearances but leaving the basic problems still unsolvedY'
In sum, the draftsmen of the Bankruptcy Rules started with
a substance-procedure test which gave little or no clue to the ex-
tent of the rulemaking power in the area of rules governing the
administration of the bankrupt's estates. The draftsmen filled
the void by adopting an attitudinal preference for a narrow con-
struction of their authority. Such a construction was inconsis-
tent both with Hanna and with interpretations of the same prob-
lem in connection with the drafting of the Rules of Evidence.
Moreover, the construction was based on precedent in other
areas which ignored the specialized nature of the bankruptcy
process. Finally, the construction adopted by the draftsmen
could have unforeseen consequences because of a prior failure
to allocate responsibility for procedural reform between the
Rules Committee and the Bankruptcy Commission. It would be
unfortunate if the Advisory Committee passed the ball to the
Commission on the ground of lack of power, only to find that
the Commission decided to accept the Advisory Committee's
work to "avoid duplication of effort" and to "avoid infringing
on the sensibilities of hard working and conscientious men."
In the next section, the rules themselves will be examined
and evaluated. In that connection, it will be seen that in some
cases meaningful procedural reform was inhibited by the drafts-
men's limited conception of the scope of their authority. How-
ever, it will be observed that in other cases the draftsmen have
not faithfully observed this limitation on their authority. For
example, some rules appear to deviate without explanation from
the theory of rulemaking restraint articulated by Professor Ken-
nedy.
II. THE NEW RULES: ARE THEY REALLY "NEW"?
Before turning to specifics I think it only fair to state my
overall evaluation. The draftsmen have acted largely as editors
of the present statute and General Orders rather than as inno-
30. See Furness, The Time is Now, 4 TRIAL, Aug.-Sep., 1968, at 17.
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vators of new procedures for administering bankrupt estates.
Duplicative provisions have been consolidated; senseless provi-
sions have been eliminated; terminology has been cleaned up.
Cosmetic changes have also been proposed, such as increasing the
apparent prestige of the referee's office-to be accomplished in
no small part by changing his title to Bankruptcy Judge, and
perhaps permitting him or her to don the judicial robe. Real re-
form, however, remains an ephemeral goal The typical case
will grind along much as it did before.
The method I have adopted in evaluating the new rules is
as follows: I have considered the various steps in a typical bank-
ruptcy proceeding chronologically, recognizing, of course, that
they may not occur in the specified order in all cases. In each
case I have attempted to identify the salient features of the ex-
isting procedure, identify any deficiencies, and evaluate the so-
lution of the proposed rules. Moreover, it should be noted that
it is somewhat misleading to speak generally about bankruptcy
proceedings. Slightly more than 90% of bankruptcy cases in-
volve nonbusiness bankruptcies, and in 85% of the cases there
are no assets available to creditors. 31 Procedures which may be
well suited to a large estate involving many creditors and sub-
stantial assets are not necessarily best for cases which involve
the distribution of a few hundred dollars to creditors. However,
aside from a few special rules applicable to no-asset cases, the
small asset case proceeds in much the same way as one involving
the distribution of several million dollars. Where appropriate,
therefore, it may be necessary to focus on a particular type of
bankruptcy case to evaluate the rule.
A. CO NCEMNENT OF THE PROCEEDING
1. Jurisdiction and Venue
Proposed Rule 116 would authorize a bankruptcy proceeding
to be filed in any district in which the bankrupt has his resi-
dence, domicile, or principal place of business, and, in the case of
a corporation, at its principal place of business or at the location
of its principal assets. The rule also provides for free transfera-
bility-regardless of whether venue was originally proper3--to
31. All of the statistics set forth herein and not further identified
are based on Ain mmTRATEn OFFICE OF THE UNrmF STATES CouRTs, TABLE
OF BANKuPTcy STATISTcs (1971). This report covers distributions in
cases terminated during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969.
32. If none of the factors supporting venue were present, the
court would lack subject matter jurisdiction. Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 111, at 22.
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other districts when required "in the interest of justice and for
the convenience of parties." The rule implements sections 2a
(1) and 32 of the Act which although cast in jurisdictional terms
had been held to be venue provisions.3 3 In one respect, Rule 116
is somewhat narrower than section 2a (1) of the Act in eliminat-
ing residence or domicile as a basis for corporate venue, and
somewhat broader in authorizing corporate venue at the location
of the corporation's principal assets. In addition, Rule 116 (a) (4)
would authorize a petition by or against an "affiliate" of the
bankrupt to be filed in the same court. An affiliate is defined to
include a subsidiary, parent, or person directly or indirectly hav-
ing 25% voting power. The likelihood that such affiliates will
have financial difficulties which are inextricably interwoven
with the bankrupt makes this an eminently sensible provision.
Nevertheless, this clear expansion of venue over affiliates is
recognized by the draftsmen to go beyond the liberal venue pro-
visions of Chapter X contained in section 129 of the Act.3 '
The stimultaneous expansion and contraction of venue pro-
visions is of significance because prior draftsmen of procedural
rules have been more than a little uncertain about their au-
thority to prescribe rules governing venue. For example, Rule
82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically eschews
any "construction" of the rules to expand venue in an apparent
recognition that venue is a substantive matter and beyond the
pale of judicial rulemaking.35 While one cannot quarrel with
the obvious attempt of the draftsmen to place the locus of bank-
ruptcy at the center of corporate activity, the bankruptcy drafts-
men evidently resolved this troublesome question of altering
venue provisions by rule without so much as a peep.
Proposed Rule 117(b) (4) builds on the venue provision to
specifically authorize the joint administration of the estates of
the bankrupt and its affiliate; such authority was previously
based on the decided cases.30 The draftsmen realize that joint ad-
ministration must be distinguished from a consolidation of as-
sets and liabilities of affiliated and related parties, which is said
to be based on "substantive considerations." However, the ready
33. See, e.g., Bass v. Hutchins, 417 F.2d 692, 694-95 (5th Cir. 1969);
In re Eatherton, 271 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1959).
34. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 116, at 35-36.
35. See Joiner & Miller, supra note 15, at 649; Levin & Amster-
dam, supra note 16, at 17. None of the commentary by those involved
in drafting the rules considered the Committee's resolution of the au-
thority issue worthy of mention. See authorities cited at note 7 supra.
36. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 117, at 40.
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authorization of joint administration, considered in conjunction
with the absence of specific authority in the past, may encourage
the "small" additional step of consolidation, especially if the
trustee finds complicated inter-company transactions, inadequate
records, or that joint administration has already resulted in a
de facto consolidation. This procedural change thus may have
subtle substantive overtones in that future bankruptcy courts
considering consolidation may not be as discriminating in future
cases as they have been in the past.3 7
2. Adjudication
Under the new rules, the filing of a voluntary petition re-
mains substantially the same and presents no significant prob-
lem; filing constitutes an automatic adjudication that the peti-
tioner is a bankrupt.38 However, involuntary petitions remain
problematical; several of the proposed rules regulating involun-
tary petitions seem destined to continue, and perhaps increase,
the current unpopularity of the involuntary route.
Under the Bankruptcy Act, involuntary petitions must be
initiated by three creditors (one if the bankrupt has fewer than
12 creditors) with claims of $500 or more, and must allege a basis
for venue, the existence of debts of $1,000 or more, the debtor's
status as a person who may be subject to adjudication, and an
act of bankruptcy.3 9 Proposed Rule 104 (c) requires that the al-
leged act of bankruptcy be stated with sufficient particularity
to permit identification of the transaction involved, thus prevent-
ing creditors having only a suspicion that an act has taken place,
but lacking hard evidence, from alleging the acts in statutory
terms and filing in the gaps through discovery.
The "act of bankruptcy" concept is justified because it iden-
tifies those cases where creditors may be prejudiced by dismem-
berment of the estate or by nonbankruptcy procedures which
frustrate the scheme of distribution in bankruptcy, or cases
where the bankrupt is in fact insolvent.4 0 However, the first
37. See In Te Flora Mir Candy Corp., 432 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir.
1970) ("consolidation ... is no mere instrument of procedural con-
venience ... but a measure vitally affecting substantive rights"). For
examples where consolidation was directed, see Chemical Bank N.Y.
Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966); Sampsell v. Imperial
Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941).
38. Bankruptcy Act § 18f, 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1970).
39. Rule 104.
40. See J. MACLAcEcHA, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW OF BA UPTcY §§
62-70 (1956); Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in
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three acts-fraudulent conveyances, preferences, and judicial
liens-are most effective when concealed or "done quietly."
Creditors who do not know of the act or simply have vague sus-
picions are still in need of the Act's protection. Consequently,
it may be argued that creditors should be able to commence an
involuntary proceeding without proof of one of the specific acts,
and should instead be afforded an easier route such as a showing
of insolvency in the equity sense. Much the same reasoning ap-
plies to the requirement of three petitioning creditors; if the pur-
pose of the act of bankruptcy doctrine is to identify cases in-
volving potential danger to creditors, one creditor should suffice.
The provision of the Bankruptcy Act requiring three petitioning
creditors and an "act of bankruptcy" reflects an uneasy com-
promise on the basic policy issue of the desirability of permitting
involuntary petitions.
The Advisory Committee apparently believed that any
change in the "act of bankruptcy" provisions was beyond the
scope of its rulemaking power because changes would tend to
encourage or discourage involuntary petitions. 1 This hesitancy
leaves these provisions in a state of uncertainty: on one hand
involuntary petitions remain authorized, while on the other the
existing provisions prevent the bringing of involuntary petitions
in instances where they appear most justified as a matter of
policy. Had the Committee construed its power broadly, as sug-
gested, it could have considered the efficacy of the present pro-
visions in serving their intended purposes, and suggested alterna-
tives. However, even with a limited conception of its authority,
the Committee could have ameliorated the creditor's present
burden in bringing involuntary petitions by allowing notice
pleading or some form of pre-petition discovery proceedings.
Proposed Rule 104 (b) codifies the established case law, hold-
ing creditors who have participated in an act of bankruptcy (other
Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 189 (1938); Note, "Acts of
Bankruptcy" in Perspective, 67 HARV. L. REv. 500 (1954). Under the
bankruptcy laws of foreign jurisdictions, bankruptcy may be invoked
when the debtor is insolvent in the equity sense or if the debtor has
ceased to pay his debts. 1 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 3.02, 3.03
(14th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as CoLLIER]. The American Act has
opted for the debtor's control over his destinies despite insolvency.
See Cook v. Tullis, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 332, 340 (1873); Wilson v. City
Bank, 82 U.S. (17 Wall.) 473, 486 (1873) (act does not cover all cases of
insolvency; in great majority of cases, debtor has opportunity to try to
recover without bankruptcy).
41. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANiKuPTcY RULES, supra note
1, at xxxvi; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 59 n.3.
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than certain assignments and receiverships) estopped from act-
ing as petitioning creditors. Here, the draftsmen seem oblivious
to a possible problem Generally, although courts "make law"
by virtue of individual decisions and the force of stare decisis,
the codification of this law becomes a substantive matter beyond
the power of judicial rulemaking.42 The authoritative basis for
codifying this doctrine of estoppel is not apparent.
The rules carry forward the traditional provisions govern-
ing proof of solvency: The bankrupt still has the burden of
pleading and proving his solvency on the day of the petition as a
defense to the first act of bankruptcy.43 The creditor will retain
the burden of proving insolvency as an element of the first, sec-
ond, third, and fifth acts of bankruptcy. 44 However, the credi-
tor's burden will be somewhat alleviated by Rule 114 which re-
quires the bankrupt to produce his records and accounts and
submit to an examination on solvency either at or prior to the
hearing if the court so orders. Although trial of the involuntary
petition may be before the referee, the bankrupt retains his
right to a jury trial under section 19a of the Act. But the jury
trial will be conducted by the referee 4" unless trial before a dis-
trict judge is demanded or provided for by local rule.
If an involuntary petition is dismissed, Rule 115(e) pro-
vides for awarding costs, including attorney's fees, to respondent.
The draftsmen purport to find authority for an award of attor-
ney's fees in General Order 34 which allows "the same costs
... [as] ... in a civil action," and section 69b of the Act
which authorizes a recovery of attorney's fees out of the bond
posted by a petitioner who has procured the appointment of a
preadjudication receiver or marshal to take charge of respon-
dent's property. General Order 34 does not authorize attorney's
fees, and while it may be difficult as a practical matter to sepa-
rate damages arising from the appointment of a receiver from
those caused by the filing of the involuntary petition itself, the
Act makes no provisions for recovery of damages which result
from the filing of an involuntary petition.4" Instead, section
42. See Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore &
Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924) (rules cannot "ab-
rogate or modify the substantive law"); Winberry v. Salisbury, 5
N.J. 240, 248, 74 A.2d 406, 410 (1950).
43. Rule 113.
44. 1 CoTias f 3.109[2]; 3.208[2]; 3.306; 3.505[2].
45. Rule 115 (b) (1).
46. See . MuiaaD & L. FomAN, BANmupcy & ARimz m
PROcEwsnmwS 49 (1971).
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69b is analytically similar to the recovery authorized under the
bonds which must be posted by creditors who seek attachments,
injunctions, or other provisional remedies. In this connection,
it has been argued that, since the authorization of an award of
attorney's fees is a substantive provision which acts to deter liti-
gation, it should not be the subject of judicial rulemaking.' 7
While the Advisory Committee may be correct in its view that
the above rules govern attorney's fees, it is not clear that this
result may be reached under the Committee's own theory of
rulemaking restraint. Moreover, in the discussion above, we
noted the Committee's belief that changes in the act of bank-
ruptcy doctrine-which could encourage or deter involuntary
petitions-were beyond its power. It is not clear why the rule
on attorney's fees, which may very well deter such petitions,
should be treated differently.
3. Filing of Petition and Schedules
Initial proceedings in voluntary bankruptcies (and involun-
tary proceedings after adjudication) will remain virtually un-
changed under the new rules. The bankrupt must still file a
petition together with schedules showing his debts and property,
and a statement of affairs. These may be filed simultaneously,
but, if the bankrupt files his petition with a list of his creditors,
an additional ten days is allowed for filing the other schedules
and a statement of affairs.48 The bankrupt must either pay the
filing fees or apply for leave to pay in installments.40
4. Dismissal of Petitions
In the past, a debtor has often found himself prejudiced by
a holding that, since an earlier dismissal of his case was on the
merits, it barred a future discharge of debts which could have
been discharged at the time of the dismissed proceeding.5 0 Pro-
47. See Wright, supra note 19, at 570; cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 477 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Note, Use of
Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. Rsv.
78 (1953) (arguing inter alia that increasing taxable costs may deter
frivolous litigation); cf. John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, Inc.,
3 N.J. 472, 70 A.2d 767 (1949) (taxation of costs including attorney's fees
is procedural matter subject to regulation by rule); Levin & Amsterdam,
supra note 16, at 15-16.
48. Rule 108(b).
49. Rule 107; Official Form No. 2. The Supreme Court has re-
cently held the required payment of filing fees to be constitutional.
United States v. Kras, 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973).
50. See, e.g., Perlman v. 332 West Seventy-second Street Co., 127
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posed Rule 120 regulates dismissals by requiring notices to credi-
tors and a hearing and by providing that the dismissal is without
prejudice unless otherwise specified. Presumably, the referee
can protect the bankrupt against unforeseen res judicata effects
of the dismissal, and creditors can protect themselves by ap-
pearing at the hearing.
B. THE PuINcIPLE OF CREDITOR CONTROL: FIRST MEETING OF
CREDITORS Am ELECTION OF TRUSTEE
It is said that a bankrupt's estate belongs to his creditors,
and therefore that creditors ought to control the bankruptcy
proceeding.51 Among the corollaries of creditor control are
creditor selection of the trustee and notification to creditors of
major events in the course of the bankruptcy. Accordingly the
proposed rules provide that the court will convene the first
meeting of creditors between ten and thirty days after adjudica-
tion. Although the creditors must have been given at least ten
days notice of the first meeting,52 the form of notice prescribed
gives them virtually no information about the amount of as-
sets, the number and amount of claims, whether there is likely
to be a dividend, or the amount of their claims as scheduled. 53
F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1942). For this reason, debtors have generally been
advised not to pay the filing fee in installments. See Treister, Some
Thoughts About Filing Bankruptcies, 36 L.A. BAR BULL. 304, 329 (1961);
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 120, at 43-44. However, the 1970
amendment to section 17b of the Act makes it clear that debts can be
discharged if they were scheduled in a prior proceeding which was
dismissed for failure to pay filing fees if the dismissal was without
prejudice. It is thus still up to the debtor to see that it is so dismissed.
51. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 208, at 75 ("Creditor con-
trol is a basic feature of the Bankruptcy Act."); Seidman, The Credi-
tors' Voice in Election of Trustees, 75 CoM. L.J. 238 (1970). This
broad statement is somewhat surprising in light of the generally criti-
cal appraisal of creditor control by one member of the Advisory Com-
mittee. Seligson, Creditors' Control of Bankruptcy Administration and
Legislation Relating Thereto, 17 AM. J. CoM. L. 48, 54, 56 (1969); Hear-
ings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary
on S.J. Res. 88, supra note 29, at 44 (Referee Bare) ("Creditor control
... has long been recognized as a myth."); Clark, Reform in Bank-
ruptcy Administration, 38 Hsnv. L. REV. 1189, 1193 (1930).
52. Rule 203 (a) (1).
53. Official Form No. 12, as applied to a typical bankruptcy, might
read as follows:
[Caption]
To the bankrupt, his creditors, and other parties in interest: XYZ
Corporation of 1234 North Street, New York, New York, having been
adjudged a bankrupt on a petition filed by it on January 2, 1973, it is
ordered, and notice is hereby given, that:
L The first meeting of creditors shall be held at Room 201, U.S.
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Creditors are presumably left to their own devices to collect in-
formation in the interim.
The prescribed form of notice has also been criticized as in-
comprehensible to wage earners, consumers, tenants, and kin-
dred groups of "unsophisticated" creditors. Such persons do not
ordinarily consider themselves creditors. The confusion may be
compounded if the bankrupt's corporate name appearing on the
notice is different from the name under which it is commonly
known.54 The notice does not inform unsophisticates of the
need to consult an attorney, of location where they can obtain
the proper form for filing claims, of the possibility that the first
meeting may be adjourned without notice to them, or of the fact
that the first meeting may be their only formal chance to ex-
amine the bankrupt or to otherwise particpate in the bankruptcy
proceedings. References to "adjudication," "dischargeability,"
"stays" under Rules 401 and 601, "elect[ing]" the trustee, and
Courthouse, Foley Square, N.Y., N.Y., on February 1, at 10 o'clock a.m.;
2. The bankrupt shall appear by its president before the court at
that time and place for the purpose of being examined as provided by
the Bankruptcy Act; and
3. March 15, 1973 is fixed as the last day for the filing of objec-
tions to the discharge of the bankrupt.
4. March 15, 1973 is fixed as the last day for the filing of a com-
plaint to determine the dischargeability of any debt pursuant to § 17c
(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.
At the meeting the creditors may file their claims, elect a trustee,
elect a committee of creditors, examine the bankrupt as permitted by
the court, and transact such other business as may properly come be-
fore the meeting.
As a result of this bankruptcy, certain acts and proceedings against
the bankrupt and his property are stayed as provided in Bankruptcy
Rules 401 and 601.
If no objection to the discharge of the bankrupt is filed on or be-
fore the last day fixed therefor as stated in subparagraph 3 above, the
bankrupt will be granted his discharge. If no complaint to determine
the dischargeability of a debt under clause (2), (4), or (8) of § 17a of
the Bankruptcy Act is filed within the time fixed therefor as stated in
subparagraph 4 above, the debt may be discharged.
In order to have his claim allowed so that he may share in any
distribution from the estate, a creditor must file a claim, whether or
not he is included in the list of creditors filed by the bankrupt. Claims
which are not filed within 6 months after the above date set for the
first meeting of creditors will not be allowed, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law. A claim may be filed in the office of the undersigned
bankruptcy judge upon an official form prescribed for a proof of claim.
Dated: January 15, 1973.
John Jones,
Bankruptcy Judge.
54. See Schrag & Ratner, Caveat Emptor-Empty Coffer: The
Bankruptcy Law Has Nothing to Offer, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1170,
1180 (1972).
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"allow[ance]" of claims can hardly be expected to be compre-
hensible to even educated nonlawyers, let alone "unsophisti-
cated" creditors. While the number of bankruptcies involving
such individuals is probably small, the referee should have no
difficulty in spotting such cases from the petition and schedules.
The draftsmen should therefore have provided for some alter-
nate and more informative form of notice in situations involv-
ing substantial numbers of "unsophisticated" creditors.55
The one important exception to the "no information" policy
is proposed Rule 202(b) which provides that creditors will be
notified if it appears from the schedules that there will be no
assets to pay a dividend and that creditors need not file claims.
Since this notice will by definition require information con-
tained in the schedules, the rule should have required that the
court await receipt of the schedules before sending notice.5 0
Moreover, because of the importance of the inclusion of such a
statement to creditors, it should be mandatory rather than op-
tional as provided by Rule 202(b).
1. Electing the Trustee
Other than an examination of the bankrupt--which will usu-
ally be perfunctory because the referee does not investigate the
bankrupt's affairs and the trustee has not yet been installed-
the major activity at the first meeting will be the election of the
trustee. Proposed Rule 207 provides for the election of the
trustee by majority vote "in number and amount of claims" of
creditors entitled to vote. Secured or priority creditors can
vote only insofar as their claims exceed the security or the al-
lowed priority. Claims of under $100 are excluded from com-
puting the majority in number of creditors; and relatives, affili-
ates, former officers, directors, stockholders, or others with
materially adverse interest are excluded from voting. The $100
exclusion is an increase from the $50 provided by section 56 of
the Act. The purported reason for the change is to avoid domi-
nation by proxy solicitors who seek to reap rewards via admin-
istration expenses.5 7 However, the change could have an obvi-
55. Although Professor Schrag and Mr. Ratner offer trenchant
criticism of bankruptcy procedures as applied to consumers, their ar-
ticle inexplicably does not even mention the Proposed Bankruptcy
Rules. Id. However, it should be noted that many of the problems
which they have perceptively identified will remain under the Rules.
56. See Rule 108.
57. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 207, at 69.
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ous effect in the admittedly rare case where there is a group of
well organized small creditors. 58 It is not clear on what basis
the draftsmen doubted their authority to change the requisite
number of petitioning creditors but yet were confident of their
authority over rules governing trustee selection. Perhaps the
rationale is that they have greater authority over the rights of
creditors inter se, than the rights of creditors vis-a-vis the
debtor.
In order to vote, creditors must have filed claims at or before
the first meeting, the referee having authority to provisionally
allow claims for the purpose of voting.59 While the notice of the
meeting does specify that the trustee will be "elected," it does
not suggest or imply that the creditor must take specific action to
qualify to vote.60  The unsophisticated creditor-be he a con-
sumer or small businessman-will be understandably irate if he
comes to the meeting only to find that he cannot effectively par-
ticipate because he failed to comply with claim-filing require-
ments of which he was unaware.
If the trustee is not elected or fails to qualify, proposed
Rule 209 requires the referee to appoint a trustee. The rule also
grants the referee the authority implicitly conferred by section
2a(7) of the Act to disapprove an elected trustee "for ineligibility
or other good cause," and to appoint the trustee instead. But
such disapproval must be "based on a substantial reason appear-
ing in the record." Some persons may be excluded solely upon
a showing that they are members of a class which is thought to
have a sufficient adverse interest to the estate to warrant ex-
clusion per se. Thus, assignees and receivers who must account
to the bankruptcy court for their stewardship, former officers,
directors, and attorneys for the bankrupt, collection agencies,
and those elected with the direct or indirect assistance of the
bankrupt are barred from serving.6 ' Other candidates may be
58. Professor Schrag and Mr. Ratner regard even the $50 mini-
mum as an invidious discrimination against the poor. Schrag & Rat-
ner, supra note 54, at 1175. Moreover, the increased availability of le-
gal services to the poor and the increased number of governmental
agencies representing consumers may make such cases involving co-
hesive groups of creditors with small claims more common. Id. at
1176-82.
59. Bankruptcy Act § 56a, 11 U.S.C. 92(a) (1970). This provision
will be incorporated in Rule 207 (a).
60. See the Official Form at note 53 supra. In fact, the notice
states that creditors have six months to file claims, thus suggesting that
there is really no reason to file promptly.
61. See generally 2 Couamm 44.06-.10; Seligson, supra note 51.
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shown to be dishonest or subject to an inherent conflict of in-
terest. Absent such proof, the creditors' choice will rarely be
disapproved. 62
2. Limitatior of Proxy Solicitation
The major advance in the trustee selection rules is restriction
on the solicitation of proxies which will enable the holder to cast
the creditor's votes for the trustee of his choice. The purpose of
proposed Rule 208 is to avoid control by persons "whose princi-
pal interest is not in what the estate can be made to yield to the
unsecured creditors but in what it can yield to those involved in
its administration or in other ulterior objectives."0 3 To that end,
it permits solicitation only by creditors (including attorneys and
agents for creditors), 4 duly elected creditors' committees, or
bona fide nonprofit trade associations. Specifically excluded
from solicitation are receivers, persons specifically excluded from
voting for the trustee (because of potentially adverse interests
to the estate), attorneys, and transferees for collection. The
holders of any proxy, as well as any solicitor or forwarder, must
(1) make full disclosure of the circumstances of the solicitation,
and in particular must allege that no consideration was paid or
promised the proxy-giver, and (2) must disclose any agreement
for compensation to be paid to the trustee or others, or for the
appointment of an attorney, accountant, or other employee of
the estate.
The efficacy of these rules to stop abuses in the selection of
the trustee may be questioned. The rules do not purport to limit
solicitation; they simply designate groups or persons who can
legally solicit.65 No provision prevents informal arrangements
62. See Advisorg Committee's Note to Rule 209, at 79; In re Peer-
less Mfg. Co., 416 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1969) (referee's order refusing to
allow election on ground that one candidate was disqualified because
of lack of experience and potential conflict of interest reversed: referee
must hold election, and if candidate elected, hold hearing on issue of
competence). Many of the cases containing language appearing to give
creditors almost unlimited power over trustee selection are instances
where the referee overruled the creditors' choice merely to appoint one
of his cronies. See In re Lenrick Sales, Inc., 369 F.2d 439 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967); In re Thomas, 263 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
1959).
63. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 208, at 75; see 2 Coi.=u
44.10; In re Eloise Curtis, Inc., 388 F.2d 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1967).
64. This result is reached by virtue of the definition of "creditor"
in section 1(11) of the Act to include duly authorized agents and attor-
neys. Bankruptcy Act § 1(11), 11U.S.C. § 1(11) (1970).
65. See Seligson, supra note 23, at 386-88.
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beforehand which have the same result as formal solicitation
and the grant of a written proxy.06 The practice in some dis-
tricts by which all creditors tacitly agree to allow the creditor
with the largest claim to determine the trustee 7 is not proscribed
under the rules. Finally, the rules would allow a few bank-
ruptcy law "specialists" to garner as clients the lion's share of
creditors' claims so that the firm speaks with one voice in elect-
ing the trustee, even though nominally representing different
creditors.6 8  This is not to say that the draftsmen of the rules
have not done the best they could. It suggests instead a more
basic problem, a problem that cannot be resolved by forbidding
solicitation to some and requiring full disclosure by others. In-
deed, one experienced referee has noted the failure of local court
rules, upon which Rule 208 was modeled, to effectively cope
with the evils of solicitation. 9 It is not clear how placing the
ineffective procedures within a new set of bankruptcy rules will
cure the malady.
3. Creditor Selection of Trustee: An Evaluation
Furthermore, there is serious question whether power to
elect the trustee should repose in creditors in either small or
large cases. The principle of creditor control appears based on
two premises: first, that creditors will ultimately receive the
proceeds of the bankrupt estate and therefore ought to control
the collection and distribution of the bankrupt's assets;7 0 second,
that creditors will in fact take an interest in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Unfortunately each of these premises is wanting.
The first justification assumes that bankruptcy is solely
a creditors' remedy. In fact, at least an equal objective of the
bankruptcy proceeding is to benefit debtors by guaranteeing a
discharge, a fresh start, and relief from the predations of greedy
and stubborn creditors. Moreover, it is assumed that the inter-
66. See Schrag & Ratner, supra note 54, at 1174.
67. See STANLEY & GniTH 78, 123.
68. See id. at 78, 122-23 (on a given day the following trustees
were "elected" in one court: X, Y, Y, Z, Z, Z; X and Z were law part-
ners); Cowans, An Agenda For Bankruptcy Reformers, 43 REF. J. 3,
50-51 (1969); Clark, supra note 51, at 1199 & n.27. For example, in In
re Construction Supply Corp., 221 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Va. 1963), one at-
torney representing six different creditors nominated himself for trus-
tee.
69. See Herzog, Bankruptcy Tomorrow, 45 AM. BANxR. L.J. 57,
68-69 (1971). Referee Herzog proposed his own "solution" which dif-
fers substantially from Rule 208.
70. See id. at 67.
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ests of all creditors are similar, and thus that control and active
participation by some creditors benefits all. This hegemony
among creditors simply does not always exist. Some creditors
may desire a fast liquidation, others a thorough investigation
and. prosecution of all possible claims; some are vindictive, while
others seek rehabilitation.71 This proposition is especially
doubtful in cases where the largest and most influential creditors
are subject to attack for their dealings with the bankrupt72 by
other less involved creditors. Finally, the principle of creditor
control assumes that there is no social interest in prompt reha-
bilitation of the debtor and no judicial interest in the efficient
conduct of the bankruptcy proceeding. In sum, the creditors'
interest is only one of many that should be represented in the
administration of the bankrupt estate.
The second justification is that creditors as the potential
recipients of any funds accumulated will take an active interest
in the administration of the estate. The converse of this stake-
in-the-venture approach is that creditor interest will parallel a
dividend that is problematical or minimal This justification
then assumes that in a substantial number of cases there will be
sufficient funds in the estate to stimulate creditor interest The
actual facts reveal an entirely different picture. In 1969, the
last year for which figures are available, 85% of the cases were
either no asset or nominal asset cases. In the remaining 15%,
cases in which some assets were available, unsecured creditors
(including both priority and general creditors) received 10% of
their claims; general creditors received less than 8% of their
claims. No figures are available to pinpoint the number of cases
in which at least one general creditor received a substantial
recovery of $1,000 or more, but the number would probably be
no more than 1 or 27. 73
71. This has been explicitly recognized in Chapter X cases where
there is much more court control and much less creditor control See,
e.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 156, 216(7), 221, 11 U.S.C. §§ 556, 616(7), 621
(1970). (Court appoints trustee; the court can "cram down" reorgani-
zation plan on dissenting secured creditors if the plan fairly protects their
rights).
72. See Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160, 168 (1929); In re Anson Mer-
cantile Co., 185 F. 993 (N.D. Tex. 1911) (trustee was an employee of
creditor who had allegedly received preferences); Clark, supra note
51, at 1199; cf. In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 369 F.2d 513, 520 (7th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (by time of petition, bank-
rupt had become alter ego of creditor); J. M.AcLAcHL", supra note 40,
§ 96, at 85 & n.2.
73. Approximately 92% of all bankruptcies are personal bankrupt-
cies, and 8% are business bankruptcies. Since almost all business bank-
ruptcies have some assets, we may assume that the 15% of asset cases in
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The conclusion that there is generally little creditor incen-
tive to participate is confirmed by the only reported studies of
the matter, as well as by the frequent observations of referees
and active bankruptcy practitioners. 7 4  The Brookings Report
concluded that creditors rarely participate in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Most creditors probably felt as did one creditor who
said that "their time was better spent in creating new business
than in participating in formalities that usually yielded little or
no return. '7 5 One early study in preinflationary days found
that three-fourths of all meetings of creditors were not at-
tended by any creditors.7 The vast majority of creditors do not
prove their claims.7 7 Especially in smaller cases, creditors have
responded to their designated role with almost complete indif-
ference.
Moreover, it is the basic disinterestedness of creditors in the
unsightly mess of bankruptcy which has spawned the wide-
spread practice of claims solicitation which, as suggested above,
is inherently impossible to control in the small cases where
creditors lack an incentive to participate in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. If creditors do take an active interest in small bank-
ruptcies it is often not out of beneficence but to utilize the bank-
ruptcy proceeding to "encourage" the bankrupt to pay up or to
"teach him a lesson." The practical inability of the referee to
separate the genuinely concerned creditors from those with more
base motives may make the bankruptcy court an unwilling
partner to the latter.
4. The New Rules and Trustee Selection
Aside from the new restrictions on proxy solicitation and
the raising of the minimum amount of claims to be counted in
bankruptcy are comprised of approximately 8% business cases and 7%
nonbusiness cases. Of the business cases, about three-fourths have assets
of at least $1,000, or a total of 6% of all bankruptcy cases. STANLEY &
GIRTH 127. Of the nonbusiness asset cases, about 14% have assets of at
least $1,000, or about 1% of all bankruptcy cases. Id. at 88. Since only
about 7% of all bankruptcy cases have total assets of at least $1,000 it
appears reasonable to assume that a much smaller number of cases
permit dividends to general creditors (after administration expenses) of
$1,000.
74. See, e.g., 2 COLLIER 1 44.06, at 1648; Cowans, supra note 68, at
50-51; Herzog, supra note 69, at 66-67; Seligson, supra note 51, at 54.
75. STAmNLEY & GiRTH 77; accord, Clark, supra note 51, at 1193-94.
76. Strengthening of Procedure in the Judicial System, S. Doc.
No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1932).
77. See generally STANLEY & GIRTH 127; Clark, supra note 51,
at 1194 & n.17; Herzog, supra note 69, at 67-68; Lee, Possible Alterna-
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the majority in number of creditors from $50 to $100, the above
rules make no changes in trustee selection. The draftsmen
should, however, have addressed themselves to two basic ques-
tions. First, should the selection process be changed, and sec-
ond, if so, what power did the draftsmen have to make the
changes?
In answer to the first question, the factors already enum-
erated, when coupled with the generally critical appraisal of
trustee performance, which will be discussed in the next section,
indicated that serious consideration be given to changing the
selection process. If changes were to be made, the draftsmen
could have completely changed the process by placing responsi-
bility for selecting the trustee either in the hands of the referee,
a panel of referees, a panel of judges, or by adopting random
selection from an "approved panel" Alternatively, the rules
could have retained creditor selection but have given the referee
somewhat greater power than he now has to disapprove the
creditors' choice.
The need to place rigorous controls on trustee selection is
already reflected in judicial doctrines which virtually exclude
certain categories of persons from serving as trustees.78 But, in
all cases, a creditor has an inherent conflict of interest with the
trustee. The trustee is supposed to investigate the affairs of the
bankrupt, including his relations with creditors. Often this in-
vestigation will concentrate on the bankrupt's financial relations
with its largest creditors. Yet it is precisely these largest credi-
tors who have the most "votes" and the greatest incentive to
participate in the proceedings and elect the trustee. It is diffi-
cult to imagine a creditor-elected trustee actively investigating
his own benefactors. And, while this problem affects all bank-
ruptcies, it is particularly likely to occur in larger bankruptcies
where the bankrupt may have large potential claims against
some creditors.79 The creditor who participates actively in
tives to the Present System of Bankruptcy Administration, 45 Am.
BANwII L.J. 149, 150-54 (1971). As a result, the few creditors who do
file may receive substantial dividends. Herzog, supra at 89.
78. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
79. See, e.g., In re Freeport Italian Bakery, Inc., 340 F.2d 50 (2d
Cir. 1965) (trustee filed exaggerated claims and failed to press claims
of the estate against relatives); In re Lurie Bros. Inc., 267 F.2d 33 (7th
Cir. 1959) (trustee elected by votes of creditors who had allegedly re-
ceived preferences); In re Construction Supply Corp., 221 F. Supp. 124,
127 (E.D. Va. 1963); In re Autocue Sales & Distrib. Corp., 148 F. Supp.
685 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (trustee elected by votes of creditors who were de-
fendants in lawsuits instituted by bankrupt); In re N.S. Dalsimer &
1973]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
electing the trustee to preserve a preference or fraudulent trans-
fer has an adverse interest which the rules foster and protect.
The Act was amended more than thirty years ago in order to
prevent creditors from opposing an involuntary petition on the
ground that creditors only did so to preserve a preference or
other voidable transfer.80 It is not clear that creditors have
demonstrated greater purity in trustee selection. In a day when
conflicts of interest are so jealously guarded against in other
areas, creditor election of the trustee remains a relic of the past.
Under the proposed rules it will be a fixture of the future.
It is impossible to determine whether the draftsmen failed
to identify trustee selection as a problem because (1) they
thought there was no problem "on the merits"; (2) they were in-
sensitive to the problem; or (3) they thought any solution was
beyond the scope of their rulemaking authority. As already
noted, (1) or (2) do not appear to be justified and, if (3) applies,
we again see an unfortunate instance of the Committee's inabil-
ity to effectuate the needed reforms because of an unduly nar-
row conception of its authority. The trustee is the key person
in the administration of the estate for both creditors and the
bankrupt. Recognizing inadequacies in the basic selection proc-
ess and then claiming impotence has to raise questions about the
reform effort.
5. The Rules on Solicitation-Some Unfortunate Byproducts
As previously noted, the rules regulate proxy solicitation
by excluding from solicitation persons other than creditors, duly
elected creditors' committees, and bona fide nonprofit trade as-
sociations. Recently, however, a new phenomenon has ap-
peared. In a few cases, poverty agencies or governmental units
have attempted to organize groups of small creditors to exer-
Co., 56 F.2d 644, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); In re Scott, 53 F.2d 89 (W.D. Mich.
1931); Schrag & Ratner, supra note 54, at 1174. The "conflict of
interest" problem is exacerbated by a series of decisions by the Second
Circuit that a trustee cannot be disqualified unless there is an actual,
as distinguished from a potential, conflict of interest. See, e.g., In re
Freeport Italian Bakery, Inc., supra at 54. Since one of the functions of
the trustee is to uncover the existence of adverse claims, how is it pos-
sible to determine whether there is an "actual" conflict of interest at
the time of selection?
80. See In re Jack Kardow Plumbing Co., 451 F.2d 123, 129-30
(5th Cir. 1971) (if creditors' jurisdictional attack succeeded and petition
was dismissed, payments within four months of petition would be
immunized from attack).
[Vol. 57:827
NEW BANKRUPTCY RULES
cise some leverage in trustee selection.8' Under the new rules a
consumer creditor represented by a legal aid attorney will pre-
sumably be allowed to solicit in the same manner as an attorney
representing any other creditor. On the other hand, a govern-
mental unit or an agency which is not serving as legal counsel is
not within the classes of permitted solicitors and presumably
will be precluded from solicitation. While the draftsmen of the
rule did not appear to contemplate such a result in their at-
tempt to prevent profiteering, it is not clear how it can be
avoided.8 2
6. No Asset Cases
Proposed Rule 211 carried forward the practice of permitting
the court to dispense with a trustee if the bankrupt has no non-
exempt property and the trustee is not elected by the creditors.
The Brookings Report demonstrated that despite this authority
trustees were appointed in a substantial number of no asset
cases.8 3 In addition, the implication of the rule is that if there
is some non-exempt property-as there must be in so-called
nominal asset cases-a trustee must be appointed.8 4  In cases
where the estate is nonexistent or small and the bankrupts ex-
amination at the first meeting of creditors reveals that it un-
doubtedly will remain small, the effort involved in appointing
such a trustee and proceeding through the motions of adminis-
tration is unwarranted. Moreover, since the trustee's fee can-
not possibly compensate for the work involved, the referee often
may appoint the same individual in more lucrative cases as a
sort of quid pro quo for his past "service." 85 No reason appears
for not designating a court officer as trustee in such no asset
and low asset cases. His sole function would be to collect prop-
erty (if any) and make distributions to creditors; the court could
always appoint a trustee if any serious problems were encount-
ered.
81. See Schrag & Ratner, supra note 54, at 1176-82.
82. In In re Vigilant Protective Systems, No. 71 B 729 (S.D.N.Y.,
petition filed July 27, 1971), the court avoided the problem by finding
that the local anti-solicitation rule applied only to attorneys. Schrag &
Ratner, supra note 54, at 1180. It is doubtful that such a construction
will be possible under the Rules.
83. STANLEY & GinRT 77.
84. A "nominal asset" case is one in which the available assets are
insufficient to satisfy administration expenses, and there is therefore
no distribution to creditors.
85. See STANLEY & GmTH 79, 192.
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C. TiE TRUSTY TRUSTEE AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE BANKRuPT's ESTATE
Primary reliance for the proper administration of the bank-
rupt's estate is placed on the trustee in bankruptcy. However,
the existing system has never completely determined the respec-
tive roles and relations of the trustee and creditors on the one
hand, and the trustee and referee on the other. Put generally,
to what extent are actions of the trustee subject to the whims of
other creditors and the supervision of the referee, and to what
extent do the other creditors or the referee have the power to
substitute their judgment for that of the trustee.
There is no a priori answer to this problem. Theoretically,
the referee could play an active role in the day-to-day adminis-
tration of the bankrupt's estate, or could serve only as a "judge"
in instances where a party questioned the trustee's actions. The
role of creditors could also range from taking an active part in
policy making decisions to passive participation in the bank-
rupt's affairs after designation of the trustee. But the most im-
portant facet in any system of administration is that the respec-
tive roles of the trustee, the referee, and the creditors be
clearly defined, and that responsibility clearly placed on one or
another party.
At the outset, one critical observation is in order. The pres-
ent brankruptcy system does not place responsibility on either
the trustee or the referee because of doubts about the ability of
either to do the job adequately. If this criticism is true, then
simply parceling out their responsibilities does not eliminate the
problem. If there is an inadequate selection process, lack of ade-
quate compensation, an excess of responsibilities, or too little
help, these causes should be attacked directly. In overview,
however, it begs the" question to assert that certain institutional
constraints on trustees and referees are necessary because such
officers do not perform properly.
1. Deposits of Funds
Section 47a (1) of the Act charges the trustee with collecting
the estate and liquidating all nonmonetary property. Proposed
Rule 605(b) provides for bank deposit of the funds collected.
The Advisory Committee's Note suggests that the trustee "will
ordinarily place the money.. . in a deposit payable on demand
by check in order to permit prompt payment of dividends."
Since dividends are generally not paid until the estate is closed
[Vol. 57:827
NEW BANKRUPTCY RULES
and only after administration expenses are determined,86 it
would appear that the funds should more often be kept in an
interest paying account. It is not difficult to maintain both ac-
counts paying interest and checking accounts in the same bank,
and transfer takes only a few minutes. The use of non-interest
bearing accounts for months or years simply because dividends
may at some point be paid is a clear waste of the estate's assets
and a windfall to the banks.
2. Sales of Property; Assumption of Contracts; Abandonment
of Property
Proposed Rule 606 continues the practice of requiring an ap-
praisal and notification to creditors where property of the bank-
rupt is to be sold although both may be dispensed with by court
order.87  The trustee has the power to assume an executory
contract pursuant to section 70b of the Act. Proposed Rule 607
requires that he file a statement within 30 days of his qualifica-
tion listing the executory contracts assumed, and requires court
approval of the assumption "whenever possible." Finally, Pro-
posed Rule 608 authorizes the trustee with court approval to
abandon burdensome property or property with no net realizable
value."" The rule does not require a hearing, but if the court
orders one, notice must be given to creditors unless the court
directs otherwise.
These are perfect examples of the failure of both the Act
and the rules to place the locus of responsibility for important
administrative functions on the trustee, the creditors, or the
referee. Where notice of a sale or abandonment of property
has been given to creditors, they are free to claim at some
later point that the trustee should have done better, the trustee
is free to assert that the creditors should have objected and the
referee should not have approved the sale or abandonment, and
the referee can suggest that he approved the sale or abandon-
86. While Rule 308 provides that dividends shall be paid "as
promptly as practicable," in many cases there should be no dividends
until the estate is wrapped up. See text following note 139 infra.
87. Both appraisal and creditor notification are designed to insure
that the property is sold at an adequate price, and, in a sense, they are
overlapping; to the extent the property is sold at or above the appraised
value there is less need for creditor participation.
88. The trustee previously had this power. See V. CouNTYMAN,
CAsEs AN MrIAxwS oN DEBTOR AND CmzIToR 420 (1964); Note, Abandon-
ment of Assets by a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 415(1953).
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ment on the basis of the trustee's recommendation and in the
absence of creditor opposition. And where no notice has been
given to creditors it is easy for the referee and trustee to engage
in mutual buck passing.
In essence, the failure to fix clear responsibility for decision
making results from a built-in distrust of the trustee as the most
logical receptacle of this authority. The word "trustee" has a
reassuring ring, suggesting a conscientious, conservative individ-
ual going about the business of managing the bankrupt's estate.
However, widespread doubts about the process of selection,8"
coupled with dissatisfaction about actual trustee performance 0
have apparently led to this trifurcated concept of responsibility.
Such an allocation, or rather, non-allocation of responsibility,
creates the additional problem of turning the referee into a
super-administrator and pro tanto identifies him with the inter-
ests of the estate rather than as an impartial arbiter. Creditors
litigating before such an individual may justifiably have doubts
concerning his objectivity.0 '
The better view is that responsibility should be clearly placed
on the trustee to obtain an adequate price for estate assets, to
assume executory contracts, and to abandon burdensome prop-
erty. All that should be required is the filing of a statement of
the action taken with the court; notice to creditors should be
dispensed with. Court approval should be required only in
cases where the asset being sold, contract being assumed, or
property being abandoned involves a substantial portion or com-
mitment of the assets of the estate or is likely to have a major
effect on the assets available to creditors.92  And even then,
court approval should not rest on the court's own evaluation
of the sensibility of the action taken but rather upon whether
the trustee has in fact made a sufficiently careful investigation
to justify the proposed action. Finally, where the trustee's ac-
tions are questioned at some later point, a creditor should not
be allowed to hypothesize that the trustee could have sold the
assets at a better price, obtained a more favorable contract, or
eked some value out of the abandoned property. Instead, the
89. See text accompanying notes 57-77 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 96, 127-30 infra.
91. See Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: Is It Too Summary?,
39 S. CAL. L. REv. 78, 85-88 (1966).
92. Another area requiring approval might be the abandonment
of real estate; this being necessary to avoid later litigation on the
marketability of title. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 608, at
188.
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issue should again be whether the trustee made a sufficiently
careful inquiry to justify his decision.
But the emphasis here is not on the issue of who should
have the primary responsibility, but rather that the Act and
the rules fail to place responsibility on anyone. It is worth
stressing that if one is hesitant about placing the responsibility
upon the trustee because of doubts about his ability, the remedy
is to obtain better performance rather than to divorce him of the
responsibility.
3. Sale of Property Free of Liens
Proposed Rule 606 (b) (3) provides that the trustee must com-
mence an adversary proceeding against the lien holders if he
seeks to sell property free from liens. In essence, this means that
the trustee must commence the action by complaint, there
must be a hearing, etc. As a matter of substantive law, how-
ever, the trustee has the right to sell property free of liens and
other interests, and transfer the lienor's interest to the pro-
ceeds, except where the value of the property does not exceed
the amount of the lien.93 The Rule 606 (b) (3) procedure appears
to require the trustee to justify the sale even before the possi-
bility of any objection arises. The substantive law would seem
to require only that the trustee give a simple notice of sale.
The rule should have provided that an objecting lienor could
commence an adversary proceeding to enjoin the sale, but that
the sale could proceed as scheduled in the absence of any ob-
jection.
4. Preservation of Voidable Transfers
Various sections of the Act authorize the trustee to preserve
voidable liens and voidable transfers for the benefit of the es-
tate. Proposed Rule 611 provides that the trustee must com-
mence an adversary proceeding joining all other persons with
interests in the property in order to preserve such liens or
transfers. Here again the substantive law gives the trustee a
right to preserve the avoided lien or transfer unless other parties
in interest can demonstrate that such preservation would be
inequitable.9 4 The trustee should therefore be able to take
93. See 4A CoLLa=u 70.97, 70.99.
94. The right to preserve is given in apparently absolute terms
by the following sections of the Act: §§ 60b, 67a(3), c(2), d(6), 70e(2);
11 U.S.C. §§ 96(b), 107(a) (3), (c) (2), (d) (6), 110(e) (2) (1970). De-
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advantage of his substantive right by simply filing a notice of
his intention to preserve the lien or transfer. An objecting
party in interest should have to initiate action to enjoin the at-
tempted preservation.
5. Investigation of the Affairs of the Bankrupt
One of the major functions of the trustee is to investigate
the affairs of the bankrupt to insure that all assets have been
located and all avoidable transfers identified.9 5 The investiga-
tion should begin, not end, with the statement of affairs and
schedules filed by the bankrupt. While it is difficult to pre-
scribe what form the inquiry should take, it should usually
include a review of various records, including the bankrupt's
prior income tax returns, local, real and personal property rec-
ords and reports from credit bureaus. It should also include in-
terviews with the bankrupt and spouse, the bankrupt's attor-
ney, accountant, major creditors, customers and suppliers, and,
if the bankrupt is a corporation, its major officers and directors.
It appears that in the overwhelming majority of small cases,
and many large cases as well, such a comprehensive inquiry is
the exception rather than the rule.0 6 Moreover, since the fore-
going type of inquiry is obviously expensive, a requirement of
full inquiry conflicts with the doctrine that estate expenses
should be minimized. Trustees are also discouraged from under-
taking such an investigation by the knowledge that, in most
cases, it not only will be unproductive but the referee will not
allow the costs of a complete investigation as an administration
expense.
On one hand, the rules could have required the trustee to
investigate only in larger cases; in all other cases, the referee
would examine the debtor at the first meeting of creditors. An-
spite such absolute language, the court does have some discretion, al-
though it is not clear how much. See 4 COLLIER 67.16, at 185.
95. See Bankruptcy Act § 47a, 11 U.S.C. § 75(a) (1970).
96. Blunt statements criticizing trustee performance are, as might
be expected, rare. However, widespread demands for reform of the
proxy solicitation rules suggest some dissatisfaction with the results of
the selection. Hints of the problem appear in STANLEY & GiRTri 79,
84, 126; Clark, supra note 51, at 1205; Herzog, Bankruptcy Tomorrow,
45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 57, 68 (1971); Schrag & Ratner, supra note 54, at
1175 & n.168, 1182 & n.214. It should be noted that the term "trustee"
should be taken to include the trustee's attorney who frequently does
the lion's share of the work because of the low statutory fees for
trustees. See Clark supra note 51, at 1197; J. MAcLACELAN, supra note
40, at 121.
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other approach would be to require "preliminary" investigation
only in cases where the bankrupt's statement of affairs or the
questioning at the first meeting revealed a problem. Still an-
other approach would be to require a complete inquiry in all
cases and to acknowledge and accept the increase in adminis-
tration costs. If so, it might be desirable to have a prescribed
checklist of required investigatory acts to enable "objective"
verification of the trustee's effort.
Although the Advisory Committee must be presumed to
know of deficiencies in trustees' performance of their investiga-
tive duties, the rules neither hint at nor attempt a solution of the
problem. The draftsmen have placed investigatory burdens on
the trustees which are uncalled for in the vast majority of cases
and have provided a penalty via surcharge for his default, with
the knowledge that the trustee cannot and will not carry out
his investigatory obligations.97
6. 21a Examinations
One provision of the rules seems destined to make it even
more difficult for the trustee to carry out his investigatory func-
tion. Proposed Rule 205 permits an examination of any person
upon the application of any party in interest-this will usually
be by the trustee. The rule further provides that the referee
shall preside at the examination, thus continuing the prior prac-
tice under section 21a of the Act. This is unfortunate since
referees have more than enough to do without presiding over
examinations that may involve detailed examination of records,
review of transactions which the referee lacks background to
understand, and questioning of the most routine and trivial
nature. The author has seen more than one referee bored-
and trying to do other work "under the table"-during lengthy
21a examinations. The referee may schedule a short time for a
long examination and make his displeasure over further examina-
tion clear to the trustee. It is not apparent why the examina-
tions could not be held before a court reporter, with court ap-
proval. In the case of a complicated bankruptcy, a further ad-
vantage of utilizing court reporters is the opportunity to con-
duct an investigation at the location of the pertinent records,
thus avoiding frequent postponement of an inquiry due to absent
documents.
97. See 2 CoLLr 47.081].
1973]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
7. Trustee Serving as Counsel
Proposed Rule 219(c) (2) constitutes a considerable advance
in the administration of the typical nonbusiness estate by pro-
viding that the trustee can serve as his own legal counsel and
receive compensation above the statutorily prescribed trustee's
fees. The rule that neither the trustee nor his firm should serve
as counsel9 8 should be limited to larger cases where financial
considerations permit the employment of this "two heads are
better than one" approach. In most smaller estates the benefits
of separate representation are far outweighed by utilizing a
trustee who presumably is already somewhat familiar with the
estate.
8. Preventing Dismemberment of Bankrupt Estate
One of the great dangers in bankruptcy administration is
that the bankrupt estate may be subject to attack in other fo-
rums in the period between adjudication and qualification of
the trustee. While the results of the "attack" may often be un-
done once the trustee qualifies, 9 the procedures are often ex-
pensive and time consuming. Proposed Rule 601 is an excep-
tionally useful provision which provides that the filing of a pe-
tition itself operates as a stay of the commencement or continu-
ation of proceedings to enforce (1) liens against property in the
custody of the bankruptcy court, or (2) judicial liens obtained
within four months of bankruptcy. The rule is grounded on the
well established principle that the court which first acquires
custody over property administers it. The new rule, however,
operates automatically. Although not specified, the bankruptcy
court's custody must be superior to other courts for this provi-
sion to be operative. 00
The automatic stay of proceedings is based on section 67a of
the Act, which gives the bankruptcy court summary jurisdiction
to avoid such liens. Rule 601, however, contains two advances
over existing law. First, it resolves uncertainty concerning
98. See In re Ira Haupt & Co., 361 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1966)(in large bankruptcy, trustee should not have appointed his own firm
as counsel).
99. See Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931);
Bankruptcy Act § 70d, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (d) (1970).
100. See, e.g., Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 326 (1931) (bankruptcy
court may not enjoin sale of property being administered in state court
proceeding to enforce lien which is valid in bankruptcy); 1 COLuzn
11 2.62[1], 2.63.
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whether the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction under 67a is para-
mount or concurrent. If only concurrent jurisdiction existed,
the bankruptcy court would be ousted of jurisdiction where
property was already in the possession or custody of another
court.10 1 The result of this provision will be to move all 67a
summary proceedings into the bankruptcy court.10 2 Second, it
operates automatically and avoids placing the trustee in the posi-
tion of having to retrieve property which is in the hands of a
purchaser at a sheriff's sale conducted after bankruptcy to sat-
isfy a lien voidable under section 67a. 10 3
D. Is BANKRUPTCY A GAwm? IF NoT, WHY IS THERE A REFEREE?
1. Background
The title accorded the individual who supervises most bank-
ruptcy activities-Referee in Bankruptcy-is symptomatic of the
problems which surround his role in bankruptcy proceedings.
At present the referee has duties which may be called clerical,
administrative, executive, and judicial His clerical duties in-
clude the responsibility for countersigning checks and keeping a
record of claims. His administrative duties, which have already
been noted, include the supervision of the activities of the
trustee, such as liquidation of the estate, sale of property, and
compromise of claims. His adjudicatory functions range from
determining dischargeability to hearing proceedings under the
lien avoidance and anti-preference sections of the Act.
One of the identified problems of the present bankruptcy
system has been the imposition of clerical duties upon the ref-
eree. Aside from being a waste of the time of a very busy pub-
lic servant, clerical duties were thought to demean the referee's
office. Critics have also objected to the unification of adminis-
trative and judicial functions in one officer, especially since the
separation of rulemaking and adjudication in administrative
agencies occurred more than twenty-five years ago.1 0 4 For ex-
101. See Landers, The Shipowner Becomes a Bankrupt, 39 U. Cnr.
L. REv. 490, 495-96 (1972).
102. As a matter of comity, it may be desirable for the trustee to
apply to the court in which the lien enforcement proceeding is pending
for a stay, or at least, to give notice that the matter is now being heard
by the bankruptcy court.
103. See 4 Couture 67.15[4]; cf. Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U.S. 486
(1903).
104. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended,
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (1970); see REP.
Ar'fy GEN. Co1m. AD. PRoc. 55-56 (1941).
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ample, George Treister, a member of the Rules Advisory Commit-
tee, pointed out that the same referee who heard contested mat-
ters also participated informally in administrative matters and
often gleaned considerable information about the estate and the
bankrupt in the process. Further, the referee often had a close
working relationship with the trustee whom he probably ap-
pointed in the first place.10 5 While the danger of prejudice to
the adverse party was most acute when the referee tried a case
whose compromise he had previously denied, or a preference or
fraudulent conveyance action he had encouraged the trustee to
bring, litigants have expressed understandable doubt over his
complete objectivity in other matters as well. 10 6
In addition to the foregoing, the referee's office has, to put
it bluntly, an image problem. Part of the problem is historical.
Until 1946 the referee's salary was a fraction of the assets of the
estate, and some felt that this resulted in a noticeable pro-
trustee bias.'0 7  And even now the referee's salary and the ex-
penses of the bankruptcy administration are not paid from the
public treasury, but from funds collected from the bankrupt's
themselves. 0 8 The "inferiority complex" was reinforced by the
distinction of referees from federal judges generally. Even to-
day, they receive less compensation, occupy smaller courtrooms,
and do not wear robes. The referee's decisions were not "ap-
pealed" to a higher court; the creditor "petitioned for review" of
the referee's decision. 10 9 Unlike the usual situation in civil liti-
gation, where the litigants were responsible for the record on ap-
peal, the referee himself had to prepare a summary of the evi-
dence and findings for the review process." 0 Once the case
reached the district judge, the referee's authority was undercut
by General Order 47 allowing the judge to open the record to
permit the taking of further testimony or the receipt of addi-
tional evidence. When the referee's findings were reviewed in
the district court, some judges did not apply the same "clearly
105. Treister, supra note 91, at 85-88; see J. MAcLACHLAN, supra
note 40, at 196, 226; Cowans, An Agenda For Bankruptcy Reformers,
42 REF. J. 3, 47 & n.62 (1969).
106. See Gendel, Summary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Related to
Possible Referee Disqualification, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 757-58 (1963);
Treister, supra note 91, at 86-87.
107. Treister, supra note 91, at 85.
108. Bankruptcy Act § 40, 11 U.S.C. § 68 (1970). This "self-sup-
porting" philosophy recently received a shot in the arm from the Su-
preme Court's decision that the $50 filing fee was constitutional.
United States v. Kras, 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973).
109. Bankruptcy Act § 39c, 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1970).
110. Bankruptcy Act § 39a(8), 11 U.S.C. § 67(a) (8) (1970).
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erroneous" standard which governed the review of judicial find-
ings but a lesser standard which gave the district judge greater
authority over factual determinations."' In addition, it is still
an open question whether the referee can conduct jury trials.
When the notion that he could was first broached, more than
one district judge recoiled in horror."12 Then there was the
crowning blow: the referee could not even punish contempts
in his own courtroom, but had to certify the facts to the dis-
trict judge in a procedure which was so cumbersome as not to be
worth the effort." 3
2. The New Provisions
The response of the draftsmen to the myriad of complaints
surrounding the referee's office was varied. The clerical func-
tions will be delegable to subordinate officers." 4 On the other
hand, despite the presence of Mr. Treister on the Committee,
nothing whatever was done to separate the administrative from
the adjudicatory responsibilities of the referee. The referee has
been spared the task of preparing anything for the petition for
review, and upon review the trial judge will not be permitted
to take additional evidence and will be required to accept the
findings of the referee unless clearly erroneous." 5
3. Bestowing the Contempt Power
Perhaps the best evidence of the continuing uncertainty
over the proper role of the referee, as well as over the scope of
rulemaking authority itself, was the sharp controversy generated
by the proposal to grant the referee the power to punish for con-
tempt.1 6 Courts are said to have an inherent power to punish
111. See In re Duvall, 103 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1939). In addition,
courts purporting to apply the "clearly erroneous" standard have in
some instances made factual redeterminations which seriously under-
cut that doctrine. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bone, 333
F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1964) (referee should have given predominate weight
to expert testimony of value of farm rather than relying on actual sale
price).
112. In March, 1960, the Judicial Conference adopted a resolution
that referees "should not preside upon jury trials of involuntary peti-
tions in bankruptcy." See Landers, The Dischargeability Bill, 40
KAN. B.J. 13, 65 & n.22 (1971).
113. Bankruptcy Act § 41, 11 U.S.C. § 69 (1970); see 2 CoLLIE T1
41.08-.10.
114. Rules 506, 507, 605(c).
115. Rules 801, 806, 810.
116. See Kennedy, The Proposed Bankruptcy Rules and Official
Forms, 46 Aim BANKm. L.J. 53, 58, 70 (1972).
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for contempt which is not alterable by statute. The Supreme
Court has thought the power so important that it has denied de-
fendants their usual constitutional right to a trial by jury and
trial before an impartial tribunal.117 Although the inherent
power to punish for contempt had been judicially extended to
bankruptcy courts,118 section 41b of the Act denied the referee
such power and instead required him to certify the facts to the
district court, which then had the discretion to punish for con-
tempt. No case has yet questioned the ability of section 41b
to restrict the referee's contempt power. Although there is sub-
stantial authority that a court's inherent power to punish for
contempt is not subject to statutory modification, 01 section 41b
will be assumed to be valid for the purpose of this discussion.
Critics attacked 41b on two fronts. First, it was argued that
the 41b contempt procedure was so cumbersome that referees
were reluctant to invoke it for minor offenses. The referee's in-
ability to punish summarily diminished his control over his own
courtroom. 120 Second, it was asserted that section 41b reinforced
the notion that the referee was not really a judge but some type
of clerk, special master, or arbitrator. Indeed, it could be
pointed out that even some administrative agencies possess the
contempt power.1 2' Two issues thus confronted the Advisory
117. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952); Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303
(1888) (dictum); Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court,
61 MICH. L. Rsv. 283 (1962); Note, Procedures for Trying Contempts in
the Federal Courts, 73 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1959).
118. See Boyd v. Glucklich, 116 F. 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1902); cf. Ex
parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873) ("The power to punish
for contempt is inherent in all courts .... ").
119. There is substantial authority that a court's inherent power
to punish for contempt is not subject to statutory modification. See
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 920, at 289 (citing authorities).
Although section 1(9) of the Bankruptcy Act defines the referee as a
"court," this seems directed toward allocating functions between ref-
eree and district court, and not pertinent to the contempt power.
120. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1965) (attorney
refused to proceed with cross-examination and insisted on taking noon
recess). See Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31
COLU . L. REv. 956, 964-65 (1931); Advisory Committee's Note to Rule
920, at 290-91. In Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1952), the
Supreme Court rejected a construction of the contempt power of a dis-
trict judge which would compel him to bring the matter as a com-
plaining witness before another judge as inadequate to deal with
"hectoring, abusive and defiant conduct." It is not clear why such a
referral procedure has been so long-sanctioned in bankruptcy.
121. While federal administrative agencies do not have the power to
punish for contempt, a number of states have conferred that power on
state agencies. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW TREAT SE § 3.11
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Committee: could the power to punish for contempt be con-
ferred by rule and, if so, to what extent should it be conferred?
The history of the contempt power as a judicial function-
possibly not even susceptible of legislative change-apparently
overcame any uncertainty respecting the first issue. The Com-
mittee resolved the latter question by the "fudge" method. Al-
though the referee was given the power to punish for contempt,
his power was limited to imposing a fine of not more than
$250.122 The minimal fines would presumably suffice to enable
the referee to preserve decorum in his courtroom while preserv-
ing the power of the district judge in the more serious cases.
Although such a limitation might be sensible if one is uneasy
about conferring the power to punish for contempt in the first
place, it makes no sense in light of the other pronouncements of
the draftsmen about increasing the prestige and dignity of the
bankruptcy court.123  The obvious compromise attests to the
failure of the draftsmen to resolve current uncertainty concern-
ing the office of the referee and suggests a fundamental dispute
as to whether the referee should be a judge. While the Commit-
tee was quick and eager to bestow the title, 2 4 they were ob-
viously hesitant to confer the power which normally accompanies
it.
4. Some Old Problems Remain
Despite the drafters' awareness of a need to separate the
administrative and adjudicatory functions of the referee (if only
by the presence of Mr. Treister on the Committee) the Rules
make no attempt to correct the problem. Although some of the
proposed solutions concerning the assignment of referees in
multi-referee districts seem unquestionably within the rulemak-
ing power, it may be that the draftsmen thought them inade-
quate. Since the Committee thought far reaching reform to be
impossible because of its narrow construction of the scope of its
rulemaking power, the rules' solution was to abstain.
Other examples of piecemeal reform are the continuing doc-
trines that the referee's decisions are reviewable by the district
(1958). See also Federal Maritime Comm'n. v. New York Terminal Con-
ference, 373 F.2d 424, 426 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967).
122. Rule 920.
123. See, e.g., ADVISORY Coi'nmxrrrnE ON BANKRuPTcY RuLEs, PRE-
LnuENAY DRAFT OF PROPOSED BAmmUPTCY RuLEs AND OFIcrAL Foams
UNDER CHAPTERS I TO VII OF THE BANxMuPTCY AcT xxxviii (1971); Her-
zog, supra note 96, at 67; Kennedy, supra note 116, at 58.
124. Rule 9017(7).
1973]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
court and the widespread allowance of interlocutory appeals
in bankruptcy matters. 12r A good argument could be made that
the referee, as a "bankruptcy judge," should be regarded as the
trial court level and that his decisions be directly reviewable by
the court of appeals. This would build on the administrative
law model of having agency determinations reviewed by an ap-
pellate court.1 2 6 In any event, apart from doubts about the
quality of justice dispensed by the referee, no compelling reason
can be advanced for bankruptcy litigants to be given an extra
rung of appeals unavailable to federal litigants generally. Simi-
larly, no reason is apparent for continuing the availability of in-
terlocutory appeals. If the draftsmen thought themselves pow-
erless to accomplish reform of this procedure, then one must
question the worth of rulemaking. If one doubts the compe-
tence of referees, then that problem should be attacked directly
rather than by the retention of provisions in the Act to protect
litigants from anticipated miscarriages of justice at the hands
of the referee.
A further problem concerns the relationship between the
Rules Committee and the Bankruptcy Commission. The Rules
Committee operated within a given institutional framework:
voluntary and involuntary petitions, administration by the trus-
tee, and supervision by the referee. The Brookings Report has
suggested a different institutional framework based on the ad-
ministrative model. Whether or not one agrees with the latter
suggestion, the promulgation of the rules may cause understand-
able reluctance on the part of the Bankruptcy Commission to
consider the kind of radical overhaul of the system which would
make the efforts of the members of the Advisory Committee
superfluous. Here then we have the tail of limited rulemaking
authority wagging the dog of overall bankruptcy reform; the re-
sult is that relics of the past have again become fixtures for the
future.
E. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
Administration expenses take more than 25% of all funds
administered in bankruptcy, and total almost $30,000,000 per
year. Trustees and attorneys for trustees garner more than 55%
of all administration expenses, and a total of about 15% of all
funds administered in bankruptcy. Since the Referee's Salary
125. Bankruptcy Act §§ 24, 39c, 11 U.S.C. §§ 47, 67 (c) (1970).
126. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970) (FTC review); 15 U.S.C.§ 78y (1970) (SEC review).
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and Expense Fund, which is presumably not subject to change
by rule, takes an additional 10% of administration expenses, it
is obvious that any major effort to cut costs must start with
trustee, referee, and attorney fees.
The conventional wisdom holds that administration ex-
penses, which have long consumed about 25% of the assets in
those cases where there are assets, are too high.12T What is un-
clear is the basis for this assertion. While there are obviously
no correct or proven formulae to calculate "proper" administra-
tion costs, it should be noted that the lawyers working on a con-
tingent fee usually receive between 1/4 and 1/3 of the recovery
and may receive as much as 1/2 on smaller claims. Collection
agencies generally charge 50% for services which in some ways
resemble bankruptcy administration. And, although the figures
on compensation in class and representative actions are sparse,
lawyers have regularly been awarded between 10% and 40% of
the recoveries. 128  Considering these possible analogies, the 25%
figure for administering bankrupt estates does not seem dis-
proportionately high.12 9
A second explanation of cost complaints is that trustees
and their attorneys are being asked to do too many things. The
assumption is that, if they were asked to do less, they could be
compensated at a lower figure. A diligent trustee and his at-
torney (if one is appointed) might be expected to confer with the
bankrupt and at least one or two major creditors, inspect the
bankrupts real and personal property as well as records of bank
accounts and stockholdings, investigate possible hidden assets
and avoidable transactions, object to improperly claimed ex-
emptions, object to the bankrupt's discharge where appropriate,
attend all creditors' meetings, and file the various required docu-
127. See 3A Couzmf_ 1 62.02[11]; Address by Chief Justice Earl
Warren, Annual Dinner of National Association of Referees in Bank-
ruptcy, Oct. 23, 1962, in 37 REF. J. 3, 4-5 (1963); Hearings Before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 88, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1969).
128. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 CoLu. L. REv. 784, 814 (1939). See also 2 G. HomTqsrm,
ConvoRATioN LAw AND PRACTICE § 732, at 253 (1959) (overall average of
20%).
129. Referee Cyr has noted that administration expenses were re-
duced about 5% between 1961 and 1968. This is especially significant
since average realization per case declined by 28% and the proportion
of administration expenses to total assets tends to rise as the realization
declines, and because the period was one of persistent inflation. Cyr,
Single Claim Jurisdiction for the United States Court of Consumer
Affairs, 46 AL BA RxI. L.J. 199, 215 n.58 (1972).
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ments. In addition, the sending of notices to a number of per-
sons for creditors' meetings or informing creditors of a proposed
settlement invariably results in a number of callers seeking fur-
ther information and possibly assistance. If the trustee refuses
to help a small creditor file a proof of claim, to photocopy the
bankrupt's schedules for a creditor, or to answer the routine
questions about the estate upon request, he is regarded as boor-
ish and uncooperative; if he helps and then seeks some measure
of compensation for his efforts, he is regarded as greedy. In
light of the duties of the trustee and his attorney, compensation
hardly appears overly generous. A third possible explanation of
complaints about over-compensation is that it is widely felt that
trustees and their attorneys are not adequately carrying out
their responsibilities. The quick answer might be that too much
is demanded of the trustee and his attorney in light of the re-
sources of most bankrupt estates; the estate pays minimal com-
pensation for minimal services.
In any event, one would expect new procedural rules to do
something about widespread complaints of excessive adminis-
tration expenses. There is no evidence to suggest that the Ad-
visory Committee even took note of these critiques, let alone at-
tempted to do something about them. Possible approaches
available to the Committee include lessening the trustee's re-
sponsibilities, changing the selection method, placing a maxi-
mum percentage limit on compensation, providing for the designa-
tion of a court officer as trustee in specified categories of cases,
or, at a minimum, giving evidence of having considered and re-
jected the criticisms as unjustified. If the new rules win ac-
ceptance this apparent void will probably yield continued
criticism. 130
F. DISTRIBUTION TO CREDITORS
Under section 57n of the Act, creditors have six months after
the first date set for the initial meeting of creditors to file
130. Rule 219 does regulate compensation of trustees and attorneys.
While the Advisory Committee was apparently hesitant about getting
into this area as one which was arguably beyond the scope of their
rule-making power, the question was ultimately resolved in favor of a
rule which simply codified the existing case law. See Advisory Com-
mittee's Note to Rule 219, at 100. On the other hand, the draftsmen
considered possible changes such as abolishing present limits in section
48 of the Act on the amount of compensation for trustees as being for
Congress. ADVISORY COMMITr ON BANKRUPTCY RULES, supra note
123, at xxxv.
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proofs of claims. The rules draftsmen have made this relic of
bygone days--when letters travelled by stagecoach-a perma-
nent part of the future.131
It is not clear whether the six month period was left intact
because the draftsmen agreed with it or whether they doubted
their power to effect a change. On a policy level, it is difficult
to take seriously the contentions that creditors really need six
months to file claims, and that the draftsmen were not hesitant
to shorten time limits where appropriate. For example, the
rules contemplate that the alleged holder of the bankrupt's
property or recipient of a preference may be compelled to go to
trial within 25 days of filing the trustee's complaint.' 3 *2 Objec-
tions to discharge or to the dischargeability of individual debts
must be made after only thirty days' notice.133 There is no jus-
tification for providing a longer period in the much less complex
matter of filing claims. The draftsmen have defined their scope
too narrowly if they doubted their power to change this six
month provision. 3 4
The draftsmen have made the approved proof of claim some-
what more cumbersome and incomprehensible,135 even though
there is evidence that it is already incomprehensible to some
"unsophisticated" creditors. 136 Moreover, under the rules the
creditor will-never receive a copy of the official form. Again, un-
sophisticated creditors might be at a loss to know where to ob-
tain the form. One possible solution is to require the referee to
make a determination from the petition and schedules that the
case is one where there are substantial numbers of creditors
who would benefit from receiving a copy of the official form.
In such a case a copy of the official form would be sent to them.
Moreover, the rules do not pay any heed to recent innova-
tive proposals to simplify the claims process for small claimants.
Since small claims are rarely contested, the creditor's claim
could be allowed simply upon his returning a self-addressed
postcard signifying his agreement to the amount listed on the
131. Rule 302(e).
132. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 704, at 201.
133. Rules 404(a), (b); 409(a) (2).
134. The six month provision has been high on the agenda for pro-
cedural reform. See Herzog, supra note 96, at 70-71; STANLEY & GnrrH
207.
135. Official Form No. 15. There is a special form for wage earn-
ers that is somewhat easier to complete. Official Form No. 16.
136. See Schrag & Ratner, Caveat Emptor-Empty Coffer: The
Bankruptcy Law Has Nothing to Offer, 72 COLum. L. R1v. 1147, 1171
(1972).
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bankrupt's schedules. In cases where there is a large group of
similarly situated creditors with small claims, the Rules could
authorize a "class claim" filed by a member of the class, a repre-
sentative such as a labor union, or by a governmental agency. :IT
The procedure for allowing claims is somewhat altered.
It will no longer be necessary for the court to formally allow
each claim. Instead, a duly filed claim is considered prima facie
valid and will be allowed unless an objection is made.1:"8 Ordi-
narily the objection will be made by the trustee, who is charged
with the duty of investigating claims. An objection to a claim is
not treated as an adversary proceeding; the objector simply
sends the objection and notice of a hearing to the claimant, and
the court will hear the pertinent evidence and decide whether the
claim is valid. 139
Proposed Rule 308 requires the court to pay dividends as
promptly as possible. Nevertheless, the Comment recognizes
that various contingencies such as requests for administration
expenses, determinations of contested proceedings, and liquida-
tions of assets, "freqently dictates caution to avoid premature
and excessive distributions that may have to be recovered."
Ordinarily it is doubtful whether preliminary dividends should
be paid. If there are more than a few claimants, such dividends
involve considerable bookkeeping and clerical expense which is
difficult to justify more than once in the bankruptcy process.
Since the final dividend can never be precisely known until the
estate is wound up, a better course would be to speed up the
process so that the estate could be closed expeditiously. If the
bankrupt's funds are invested in an interest bearing account,
creditors will not be prejudiced by delaying the final distribu-
tion.
G. THE BANKRUPT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF His ESTATE
The bankrupt seeks three interrelated ends from the bank-
ruptcy process. The first is discharge of his debts. Second, and
in tandem with the first, he seeks relief from the pressure of his
creditors and protection against any attempt by them to fru-
137. See id. at 1176-82, 1190-91. Rule 723 indicates that Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-authorizing class actions-ap-
plies in "adversary proceedings." However, the filling of a claim is
not an "adversary proceeding" under Rule 701. Hence, there is no au-
thority for the class proof of claim.
138. Rule 306(b).
139. Rule 306(c).
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strate his discharge. Third, he seeks to gain any exemptions to
which he is entitled under state law as incorporated in section 6
of the Bankruptcy Act.
1. Discharge
There are two basic exceptions to the general right of a
debtor to have his debts discharged in bankruptcy. Section 14
sets forth a number of grounds upon which a discharge may be
denied in toto. Section 17 sets forth eight categories of claims
which are not dischargeable; in any such case, the bankrupt can
only obtain a discharge which exempts the nondischargeable
debts. There are a few further exceptions. Under section 63 of
the Act, certain claims are not provable-meaning that they
survive bankruptcy. The most important are tort claims which
are not the subject of actions pending at the time of the petition.
Where an otherwise provable contractual claim involves dam-
ages difficult or impossible to calculate, it may be converted into
an unprovable claim under section 63c.
Congressional amendments of 1970, and to a lesser extent
those of 1960, provided the bankrupt with the necessary protec-
tion of his rights to discharge. The rules carry forward the ex-
isting practice.140 The court must fix a date between 30 and 90
days after the first date set for the initial meeting of creditors
for filing objections to the bankrupt's discharge, or the dis-
chargeability of particular debts pursuant to section 17 of the
Act. Thirty days notice must be given of the deadline for filing
such objections.141 However, if notice of no assets is given, the
court may determine dischargeability at the first meeting of
creditors and upon ten days notice.1 42  Here the draftsmen
seemed to have made an untenable distinction between no asset
and low asset cases. There is no reason why the referee should
not have discretion to determine dischargeability at the first
meeting of creditors in any case. Such a short time limit would
reinforce the policy of the Bankruptcy Act to discourage objec-
tions to dischargeability1 43
140. See, e.g., Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 Az.
BAmi. L.J. 1 (1971); Landers, supra note 112.
141. Rules 404(a), (b), 409(a) (2).
142. Id.
143. A recent study showed that objections to the dischargeability
of individual debts were made in approximately 12% of the cases.
Shuchman, Impact Analysis of the 1970 Bankruptcy Discharge Amend-
ments, 51 N.C. L. REv. 233, 247-54 (1972). This was a substantial reduc-
tion from the number filed before the amendment. Id. at 243-45, 248.
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2. Protection of the Discharge
The bankrupt has a need for protection both during and
after the bankruptcy proceedings. The main danger is that
greedy creditors may attempt to evade the bankruptcy proceed-
ings by action in another court which they hope the bankrupt
will ignore for a sufficiently long time to enable them to reac-
quire or retain some of the rights which they otherwise appear
to lose in the bankruptcy proceeding. Prior to 1970, this issue
frequently arose with reference to debts which were allegedly
not discharged by section 17 of the Act. Not only did the dis-
charge itself fail to specify which debts were discharged but,
absent special circumstances, the bankruptcy court was not
even permitted to determine dischargeability questions. In-
stead, a creditor who believed that a debt was not dischargeable
was able to sue in state court where the former bankrupt was
expected to raise his discharge as a defense. Widespread abuses
by creditors led to Congressional reform which required that
the most common objections to dischargeability-liabilities based
on a false financial statement, frauds, conversions, and willful
torts-be determined exclusively in the bankruptcy court.' 4'
The bankrupt's discharge will be supplemented by a broad-based
injunction: within 45 days of discharge creditors will be sent a
notice of discharge informing them that any judgments on dis-
charged debts are void; that all debts which are discharged
by statute or which have been determined to be dischargeable
are discharged; and enjoining creditors from instituting or con-
tinuing action to collect the debts.1 4 5
Prior to the rules, however, the bankrupt had no absolute
protection prior to obtaining his discharge. Although section
Ila authorized the court to grant a stay if it was applied for,
the procedure was not automatic. Now, Rule 401 (a) specifically
provides that the bankrupt's adjudication operates as an auto-
matic stay of all pending or future actions if the action or judg-
ment is founded on "an unsecured provable debt", except one
which is not dischargeable under sections 17a (1), (3), (5), (6), or
(7) .14 To obtain relief from the stay, a creditor must file a for-
Objections to the bankrupt's discharge have been sustained in fewer
than 1% of the cases. STANLEY & GIRTH 90-91.
144. See authorities at notes 140 and 143 supra.
145. Bankruptcy Act § 14f, 11 U.S.C. § 32(f) (1970).
146. The claims not excepted are for certain tax claims, unsched-
uled debts, wages and commissions, obligations to employees on se-
curity deposits, and alimony and support.
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mal complaint commencing an adversary proceeding. The stay
remains in force until the case is dismissed or the bankrupt is
denied a discharge; if the bankrupt is granted a discharge the
stay is replaced by the broad based injunction noted earlier.
Thus, under the rules and the Act, the bankrupt will obtain
continuous protection against the possibility that his discharge
will be sandbagged in other courts from the time of adjudication.
To be sure, there is no specific authority for the predischarge
injunction. However, section 11a which authorized the court to
grant such a stay of suits on dischargeable debts and the policy
of the 1970 amendments to protect the discharge provide con-
siderable support Moreover, it appears that requests for such
injunctions are granted as a matter of routine when requested,
and similar injunctions are regularly included in orders authoriz-
ing Chapter X and XI proceedings.147 Thus, it appears to save
considerable time and effort to issue the broad injunction first,
and place the initiative upon creditors to secure modifications.
3. Exemptions
Section 6 provides that the bankrupt shall have all exemp-
tions provided by state law and may claim those exemptions in
his schedule of assets. Rule 403 requires the trustee to examine
the claimed exemptions and to specify to the court those exemp-
tions which are properly and improperly claimed within 15 days
of his qualification. The trustee's report has prima facie
validity, and objections to the report by the bankrupt or a
creditor will be heard by the referee. The objector carries
the burden of proof. There is, however, no provision for notify-
ing creditors of the claimed exemptions. In this respect, Rule
403 places the burden of performing the necessary investigatory
act on the trustee. That being the case, it is not clear why
creditors retain any right to object. Again, it reflects a nagging
distrust of trustee performance. Moreover, it should be noted
that in contrast with the rules governing sales of assets, assump-
tion of contracts and abandonment of property, the referee's
approval of the exemption list is not required. It is not clear
why the draftsmen made this distinction.
4. Representing the Bankrupt
The filing or contemplation of a bankruptcy petition indi-
cates that the usual restraints on incurring excessive obligations
147. See STALmy & G=IRH 84 (requests for injunctions against
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have failed. As a group, potential bankrupts face an array of
decisions of a legal nature. The potential bankrupt must choose
from among a straight bankruptcy petition, a Chapter XIII peti-
tion, a state law composition proceeding, a private arrangement
with his creditors, or doing nothing. Obviously an informed
decision is impossible if the potential bankrupt does not under-
stand the legal ramifications of each course of action. If he de-
cides to file a straight bankruptcy petition, the debtor will
ordinarily need help in filing schedules, listing creditors and the
amounts owed, dealing with secured creditors, securing his
discharge, and claiming exemptions. During the bankruptcy
proceeding, he may need legal advice in regard to an investiga-
tion or contested matter. After obtaining his discharge, the
bankrupt may still have carry-over problems with contumacious
creditors who have commenced legal proceedings in spite of the
discharge or who are trying to induce the bankrupt to assume
his former debts.
Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act provides for the represen-
tation of the bankrupt in the bankruptcy proceeding, with the
bankrupt's attorney to be paid from the estate. Such an ap-
proach creates obvious difficulties in the vast majority of cases
where there is no estate, or where the bankrupt's attorney must
share a tiny estate with an array of trustees, attorneys, ap-
praisers, referees, and other hat holders. For instance, in the
15% of bankruptcy cases in which there were insufficient assets
to cover administration expenses (nominal asset cases), the
bankrupt's attorney received an average of slightly over $10.
While these attorneys probably received something more from
the bankrupt or his friends or relatives, the totals were hardly
princely. In addition, the court may inquire as to any pre-
bankruptcy payments or promise of compensation in order to
insure that the bankrupt's attorney is not overpaid: such pre-
bankruptcy payments are not permitted if the bankrupt is
paying the filing fee in installments. 148
The bankrupt's lawyer is thus paid very little. As might
be expected, he also does very little, as evidenced by the Brook-
ings Report finding of grave deficiencies in the bankrupt's repre-
sentation. The spectre of the bankrupt's attorney running
madly around the courthouse to find his client (the bankrupt)
before the first meeting of creditors would be funny if it was
creditor interference granted in almost all cases); Landers, supra note
112, at 66 n.23; Schrag & Ratner, supra note 136, at 1185.
148. Rules 107(b) (3), 220.
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not so tragic.149 Unfamiliarity with the case seems to be the
rule rather than the exception. Moreover, even if the bankrupt
does have an attorney who is sufficiently compensated from
the estate, he is nonetheless disadvantaged by the rule that the
attorney may not be compensated out of estate funds for per-
sonal benefits to the bankrupt, such as securing exemptions or
insuring the bankrupt's discharge.10  Finally, the bankrupt's
attorney is not expected to represent him in any post-bank-
ruptcy legal matters, even if they grow out of the bankruptcy.
There is likewise no provision for debt-counseling even though
the bankrupt is particularly vulnerable to the soft-sell of eager
creditors after the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy system, al-
though designed to give the bankrupt a fresh start, may have
led him to a swamp from which he cannot be pulled for an-
other six years. 15'
About the only justification for this state of affairs is that the
bankrupt is no worse off in connection with bankruptcy matters
than he is generally in dealing with his creditors. Put another
way, the problem is hardly unique to post-bankruptcy disputes
with creditors, but rather is inherent in litigation between the
small or middle income consumer and large well-financed oppo-
nents. Be that as it may, the draftsmen of the rules blithely ig-
nore the problem while the apologists for the present system
continue to defend it on the assumption that there is no inherent
flaw.152 However, it seems that the Brookings suggestions for
administrative control are based in large part on the obvious
deficiencies in the bankrupt's representation. While the Brook-
ings proposal may be objectionable, it is difficult to sustain the
attack on it by arguments that administrative control would
deny the bankrupt effective representation by counsel of his
own choosing and would substitute an administrator. The fact
is that such representation may be substantially more than the
bankrupt gets under the present system.
I. CONCLUSION
Subsequent to the preparation of this Article, an event oc-
curred which is bound to make those in the rulemaking area
149. See STANLEY & GmrT 80; Cowans, supra note 105, at 52.
150. See V. CouNTrm.A, CAsES AND MATEmrALS oN DEBTOR AND CREDI-
TOR 337-38 (1964).
151. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(5), 11 U.S.C. 32(a) (5) (1970); see Cow-
ans, supra note 100, at 4-5.
152. See Levit, Bankruptcy Administration and the Brookings Re-
port-A Critical Analysis, 77 CoM. L.J. 179, 181 (1972).
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shudder. The Federal Rules of Evidence, eight years in the
drafting, finally finished, duly promulgated by the Supreme
Court, and sent to Congress, received an icy reception in the leg-
islative halls. Just two days after submission, the Senate
passed legislation which would delay the effective date of the
rules. 1 53  Little more than a month later, the House went fur-
ther and enacted by the lopsided majority of 399 to 1 a bill to
delay the effective data of the rules indefinitely and until Con-
gress specifically said otherwise. 5 4  A chorus of House mem-
bers expressed vehement opposition to rules which altered and
restricted traditional husband-wife and doctor-patient privileges,
expanded governmental immunity for state secrets and official
information, affected state-law presumptions, expanded the pow-
ers of trial judges, and altered the ubiquitous hearsay rule.
Some Representatives were particularly upset with the failure
to accord a newspaper reporter's privilege, while others were
simply puzzled that the rules dealt with such a privilege when
Congress was considering legislation dealing with precisely the
same subject. Other House members complained that the rules
had not been submitted to the ABA for comment, and concern
was expressed with last minute changes made at the instigation
of the Justice Department. Finally, some members of Con-
gress expressed resentment against what they regarded as an in-
trusion into the legislative domain. Indeed, the legislation was
termed a "bill to promote the separation of powers."
There are valuable lessons to be learned and applied to
bankruptcy rulemaking. On one hand, it might be argued that
the attitude of rulemaking restraint articulated by the bank-
ruptcy draftsmen-although, as noted in the text, not always
followed-was a shrewd choice. However, an analysis of the
House comments reveals something even more fundamental
about the debate's; many Congressmen disagreed "on the mer-
its" with the new evidence proposals and frequently regarded
them as a step backward rather than forward. The new bank-
ruptcy rules may face a similar reaction. Moreover, the ex-
pressed concern with the evidentiary rule governing privilege
being adopted while Congress was considering the reporter's
153. Although the Rules were approved by Court Order on Novem-
ber 20, 1972, for reasons which are unclear, they were not sent to Con-
gress until February 5, 1973. 119 CONG. REvc. H 1721 (daily ed.
Mar. 14, 1973) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). The Senate action appears at
119 CONG. REC. S 2241-42 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1973).
154. The House action, and the accompanying debate, appears at
119 CONG. REc. H 1721-31 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973).
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privilege may raise legitimate questions about the respective
roles of the rules promulgated by the Advisory Committee and
anticipated proposals by the Bankruptcy Commission. Again,
one may be concerned with the lack of apparent public atten-
tion paid to bankruptcy rulemaking. Both the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the now moribund Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were preceded by decades of discussion and debate among
scholars and practitioners about the wisdom and scope of such
rules, and particular attention was frequently focused on par-
ticular provisions which might be included. Bankruptcy rule-
making was preceded by a much more general discussion, lim-
ited almost entirely to bankruptcy "buffs," expressing the gen-
eral need for reform. Even more surprisingly, there has been
a paucity of attention paid to the Advisory Committee's draft of
the Bankruptcy Rules, and almost all of the scholarly writing
has been by members of the Advisory Committee. Indeed, the
American Bar Association apparently regarded the eventual
adoption of the rules as assured. In the past year, long before
the final draft had even been submitted by the Advisory Com-
mittee to the Supreme Court, the ABA held four institutes in
various cities to familiarize the bar with the still-to-be-accepted
rules.
The attorney who deals with few bankruptcy matters and
has not heard of the new rules may feel right at home when he
next appears in the bankruptcy court. If, perchance, the bank-
ruptcy judge enters his courtroom wearing his robe and casti-
gates the attorney for calling him a "referee," the attorney will
be certain that the era of the new rules has begun. We in the
audience will unfortunately have to watch and listen carefully,
for this is one of the precious few clues we will have.
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